Contextualism and Confusability - Florida Philosophical Review

Graduate Essay Prize Winning Paper
of the 46th Annual Meeting of the
Florida Philosophical Association

Jeremy Kirby, Florida State University, Tallahassee

The most promising approach toward explaining skeptical puzzles seems to be that employed by the contextualist. Contextualists enjoy both a resolution and an etiology of skeptical puzzles. However, Stephen Schiffer, in his “Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism,” has argued that “the contextualist fails to solve the paradox¹.”1 In what follows, I essay a response to Schiffer’sa objection. I begin with an exegesis of the Contextualist’s solution to the skeptical puzzle. Subsequently, I summarize and outline Schiffer’s argument against the Contextualist’s solution to the skeptical puzzle. In the final section, I provide a criticism of Schiffer’s argument against the Contextualist’s solution.

Skepticism and Contextualism

Epistemologists provide skeptical puzzles in many and sundry ways. The skeptical argument with which I am presently concerned, hereafter referred to as the (SA), runs as follows:

I don’t know that I’m not a BIV (i.e., a bodiless brain in a vat who has been caused to have just those sensory experiences I’ve had).
If I don’t know that I’m not a BIV, then I don’t know that I have hands. Hence,
I don’t know that I have hands.

This argument has an air of paradox because we consider it sound; and, yet, we think of it as expressing a false conclusion. Since one cannot rule out the possibility of being a BIV, one is loath to deny premise one. Likewise, the conditional in the second premise seems undeniable, since if I don’t know that I’m not a BIV, I don’t know that I have certain properties which a BIV lacks, i.e., hands. The conclusion, however—which derives validly via modus ponens from the first and second premises—seems to be false. As a result, something of an impasse is presented by the (SA), as one finds oneself in the puzzling position of maintaining three things which are seemingly mutually inconsistent: “I don’t know that I’m not a BIV”; “If I don’t know that I’m not a BIV, then I don’t know that I have hands”; and the negation of the (SA)’s conclusion: “I know that I have hands.” ²

Of course, the skeptic will maintain that the (SA) is unequivocally sound and that it really is the case that we are completely ignorant of even the most basic Moorean facts, e.g., I have two hands. ³ However, if we side with the skeptic, we are quickly led into a most inclusive form of skepticism. Try telling the judge you can’t sign the traffic ticket because you don’t know that you have hands. The skeptic’s position is not without force; but it is not altogether acceptable
either.

A Moorean, or defender of common sense, will maintain that the skeptic’s position is
without force. He will attempt to stand the argument on its head by contrapositioning premise
two thus:

I know that I have hands.
If I know that I have hands, then I know that I’m not a BIV. Hence,
I know that I’m not a BIV.

Taking this Moorean argument into consideration, hereafter referred to as the (MA), suppose we attempt to criticize the first premise of our Moorean interlocutor’s argument. We might ask how our Moorean knows premise one, when it is possible that he is a BIV merely thinking “he” has hands? Our interlocutor might respond either that it’s not possible that he is a BIV or that he simply knows—in a way that doesn’t require further explication—that he has two hands. Taking the first horn of the dilemma—not that anyone would—would be tantamount to claiming that necessarily he isn’t a BIV, which would, in effect, be tantamount to claiming that there is an inherent contradiction in maintaining that he is a BIV. If the second horn of the dilemma is maintained, then it seems a mere tautology is asserted: “I know that I have hands because I know that I have hands.” However, offering an uninformative tautology, such as “I know that I have hands because I know that I have hands,” to solve the skeptical puzzle, seems to be an arbitrary solution at best. One begins to wonder why we are compelled to consider the skeptical puzzle at all, when we might just as easily wave our hands and go home. While the (MA) seems prima faciecompelling, insofar as it affirms our most common beliefs, a solution with more explanatory force would be considerably more appealing.

Some philosophers deny the second premise of the (SA) by arguing that it is not the case that if I don’t know that I’m not a BIV then I don’t know that I have hands. These philosophers deny premise two of the (SA) by denying that knowledge is closed under known implication, i.e., they deny that if one both knows that pand that p implies q, one knows q. However, denying that knowledge is closed under known implication here seems incredibly ad hoc. The denial that knowledge is closed under known implication seems useful only vis-à-vissolving skeptical puzzles, such as the one in question, and completely irrelevant in nearly every other situation.For example, in a beginning logic course, if an adept student knows that pimplies q, and knows that p, surely he knows q. And yet, those who support the solution to the skeptical puzzle under present consideration will deny that an adept student knows q on the basis of knowing that p then q and that p. In short, the proposal to deny that knowledge is closed under known implication offers a solution to the skeptical puzzle, but only at the cost of generating a great deal of skepticism about our ability to reason deductively vis-à-vispropositions concerned with
knowing. ⁴ We should try to do better.

Contextualists offer a solution different in kind from those offered heretofore. The
Contextualist maintains that the propositions expressed by “I don’t know that I’m not a BIV”; “If I don’t know that I’m not a BIV, then I don’t know that I have hands”; and “I know that I have hands” are all true—albeit not simultaneously.

A semantic theory concerning the context-sensitivity of utterances plays a significant role in the Contextualist’s solution to the skeptical puzzle. The crucial point to bear in mind vis-à-visa context-sensitive utterance is that the proposition expressed by the utterance derives its intelligibility, in part at least, from the context in which it occurs. Take, for example, the sentence “It is raining.” The sentence “It is raining” does not express any proposition per se. For the sentence to express a proposition, it needs to apply to a specific spatio-temporal location; for example, the indexical phrase “in London” could be supplied. Only when a spatio-temporal location in context is understood, tacitly or otherwise, can the sentence “It is raining” express a proposition, i.e., a statement that asserts or denies something. When “It is raining” is expressed by someone standing in London, ceteris paribus, it likely expresses the proposition “It is raining in London.” If “It is raining” is uttered while standing in Oxford, it likely expresses the proposition “It is raining in Oxford.” The moral to be gleaned is simply that some sentencetokens, call them context-sensitive sentences, can express different propositions depending on the context in which they are uttered. ⁵

Some epistemologists maintain that knowledge ascriptions are context-sensitive. The truth value of knowledge attributions depends both on the situation of the person to whom
knowledge is being attributed and on the circumstances surrounding the person attributing knowledge. The context upon which knowledge ascriptions are dependent is usually said to be part and parcel of the standards implied in the conversation in which the ascribers of knowledge have been engaged.

Few will doubt that in a great many cases conversational context determines the scope of concern and to a commensurate degree the scope of determination for the truth value of a given proposition. For illustration, suppose I answer correctly a question concerning nineteenthcentury history in a game of Trivial Pursuit. My competitors, recognizing that I know the answer, allow me to advance my game piece accordingly. Were I to declare, however, that I know the content of this answer among a group of scholars of nineteenth-century history, who require that an individual be acquainted, as I am not, with all the primary, secondary, and otherwise relevant literature on the subject, to be qualified in asserting that I know the answer, I would be making a false declaration. ⁶ The standards in the latter conversation have, as it were, been ratcheted up by the change in context, to the extent that my declaration of knowledge vis-àvis the content of my Trivial Pursuitanswer no longer makes the grade. A change in context, as the above example illustrates⁷ can issue in more stringent standards of knowing than those
normally insisted upon.

The scenario given above is similar to that employed by Contextualists in their solution to the skeptical puzzle. Contextualists maintain the following: “I know that I have hands” is true in normal discourse, i.e., discourse in which the BIV hypothesis is not being entertained. Furthermore, I can go about my daily business knowing fully all my Moorean beliefs until I begin to entertain the BIV hypothesis. Once one appeals to the BIV hypothesis, however, “I know that I have hands” becomes false. When appealing to the BIV hypothesis, ipso facto, the hypothesis increases the standards and restrictions for attributing knowledge to the extent that the conclusion “I don’t know that I have hands” really does follow.

So how does this solve the skeptical puzzle?—the puzzle which, one will recall, portends that we are compelled to maintain three things as true which are seemingly mutually
inconsistent. The Contextualist resolves the puzzle by recognizing “I know that I have hands” expresses a true proposition, as the Moorean suspected, except in contexts in which the standards and restrictions for attributing knowledge are more stringent due to one’s entertaining the BIV hypothesis. Hence, the skeptic is, moreover, correct in maintaining that the (SA) is sound. And if the argument is sound, and is recognized as such, then the conclusion of the (SA), i.e., “I don’t know that I have hands,” is true and inconsistency with regard to the skeptical puzzle is thereby averted.

The (MA), however, isn’t sound, since its mention of the BIV hypothesis makes the standards for being correct too stringent. Nonetheless, basic Moorean beliefs, such as “I know that I have hands,” are preserved by the Contextualist’s solution, since they are true in most contexts—contexts, no less, which immensely outnumber skeptical contexts. In short, by recognizing that knowledge ascriptions are context-sensitive, the Contextualist resolves the puzzle by giving the skeptic his due while simultaneously keeping the common sense beliefs upon which we rely in our daily lives sufficiently intact.

Of course, incumbent on the Contextualist is the need to explain why previously we were mistaken in thinking that the triad is a paradox. The skeptical puzzle presents an air of paradox only when the proper context in which one finds oneself is not recognized. The triad is not mutually inconsistent once it is seen that the proposition expressed by “I know that I have hands” is in fact true, save contexts in which the BIV hypothesis is entertained. Naturally, the puzzle presents an apparent paradox for any individual who doesn’t recognize that the BIV hypothesis has altered the context so as to make the standards for knowing more stringent; in a condition such as this an individual will think that the token “I know that I have hands” expresses one proposition which is paradoxically both true and false. But “I know that I have hands,” according to the Contextualist’s analysis, can express one of two propositions, i.e., “I know that I have hands” and “I know that I have hands while entertaining the BIV hypothesis.” ⁸ The former according to the Contextualist is true, the latter false. Hence, the puzzle is generated by a lack of recognition concerning the change in context issued in by the BIV hypothesis.

Before turning to examine Stephen Schiffer’s criticism of the Contextualist’s solution, I would like to list and summarize some of the advantages which the Contextualist’s solution has over other “solutions⁹.” Unlike the skeptic’s proposal, the Contextualist’s solution leaves our common sense beliefs largely intact—keeping our common sense beliefs intact was, after all, the virtue of the Moorean approach. But the Moorean approach in its reliance on an uninformative tautology seems, as we saw, to be merely evincing the declaration “I know that I’m not a BIV.” In contrast, the Contextualist’s approach resolves the puzzle and also provides an etiology of why we are compelled to consider the puzzle ab initio. Most importantly, the Contextualist’s solution provides an explanation of why we have conflicting intuitions vis-à-visthe conclusion of the (SA): when we fail to recognize the more stringent standards issued in by the BIV hypothesis, we mistakenly think that “I know that I have hands” must refer to one proposition rather than two. As a result, given both the force of the (SA) as well as our common sense, preanalytic, intuitions, we think “I know that I have hands” is both true and false. Furthermore, the Contextualist’s solution, in both explaining and resolving the puzzle, manages to preserve our general notions regarding the closing of knowledge under known implication.

Schiffer’s Challenge to Contextualism

The essence of Schiffer’s criticism of the Contextualist’s solution is that the semantic theory employed by the Contextualist is incompatible with the explanation of why the skeptical
puzzle arises. He writes:

Both the semantics and the error theory are needed for the Contextualist’s response to the [SA]. ¹⁰ The semantics is needed to locate the false proposition in the set of mutually inconsistent propositions that we get by combining [SA]’s premises with the denial of its conclusion, and the error theory is needed to explain why the sentence expressing the false proposition—the sentence ‘I know that I have hands’—deceptively appears to be stating a true proposition. The trouble is that the semantics is refuted by the error theory . . . . It’s as though a fluent, sane, and alert, speaker, who knows where she is, were actually to assert
the proposition that it’s raining in London when she mistakenly thinks that it’s raining in Oxford. ¹¹

Schiffer seems to be suggesting that speakers do not confound the propositions they are uttering in one context with propositions they would be uttering in other contexts. And, so the argument runs, if speakers do not make such an error, with regard to context-sensitive utterances, then they do not err in the way the Contextualist maintains—i.e., they wouldn’t, once introduced to the BIV hypothesis, fail to recognize that the proposition being expressed is “I know that I have hands while entertaining the BIV hypothesis.” For the sake of simplicity, we can think of the argument as taking the form of a reductio ad absurdam:

Suppose the Contextualist’s response to the skeptical argument is correct.
Both the semantic theory, i.e., that knowledge claims are context-sensitive, and the error theory, i.e., that people uttering knowledge sentences systematically confound the
propositions their utterances express with propositions they would express by uttering these sentences in other contexts, are correct (from 1).

By severance,

Knowledge claims are context-sensitive (2).
People uttering knowledge sentences “systematically confound the propositions their
utterances express with propositions they would express by uttering these sentences in
other contexts”(2).

However,

With regard to context-sensitive claims, speakers [do not] confound the propositions their utterances express with propositions they would express by uttering these sentences
in other contexts.

Hence,

With regard to knowledge claims, speakers do not confound the propositions their utterances express with propositions they would express by uttering these sentences in other contexts (3,5).

So, by conjunction,

“People uttering knowledge sentences systematically confound the propositions their utterances express with propositions they would express by uttering these sentences in other contexts” and it’s not the case that “people uttering knowledge sentences
systematically confound the propositions their utterances express with propositions they would express by uttering these sentences in other contexts” (4,6).

Whence it follows:

The Contextualist’s response to the skeptical puzzle is false.

Schiffer, Contextualism, and Confusability

I want to begin my criticism of Schiffer’s argument by extracting the following subargument with which to work:

Knowledge claims are context-sensitive (2).
With regard to context-sensitive claims, “speakers . . . [do not] . . . confound the propositions their utterances express with propositions they would express by uttering these sentences in other contexts.”
With regard to knowledge claims, speakers do not confound the propositions their utterances express with propositions they would express by uttering these sentences in other contexts (3,5).

Now, recall that Schiffer’s formulation of the error theory runs as follows:

“[The error theory is] the claim that people uttering certain knowledge sentences in certain contexts systematically confound the propositions their utterances express with the propositions they would express by uttering those sentences in other contexts.”

For my part, it is not clear where Schiffer locates the error in the error theory. However, the direct object of “confound,” in his formulation, is “the propositions.” Hence, with respect to one
plausible interpretation of Schiffer’s formulation, the error in the error theory occurs not with regard to the “certain context” in which a speaker thinks he is, rather, it is the proposition which the speaker thinks he is expressing which is aproposfor a context other than the one in which he thinks he is. ¹² For example, to borrow Schiffer’s language, it is as if a “fluent, sane, and alert, speaker” ¹³ who, having surveyed his circumstance, thinks that it is raining in London, and intending to express that it is raining in London, expresses that it is raining in Oxford—all the while conscious of the different referents (or mere difference) of “Oxford” and “London.” Such an error theory as this, admittedly, doesn’t seem in the least tenable. Is the Contextualist committed to this error theory?

Would it not be a great deal easier to suggest that a speaker or thinker, supposing that the skeptical puzzle is not merely a linguistic phenomenon, confuses the context he is in rather than the proposition he is expressing? ¹⁴ The former quite plausibly allows for a speaker to be mistaken and still know what he is saying; the latter is quite counter-intuitive insofar as it does
not.

Schiffer does not offer an argument denying that the error can occur over context. So there is no apparent reason why it cannot be maintained that what is being confused is not the
proposition expressed by the utterance but, rather, the context of the utterance. For example, the speaker might not know that he is presently in Oxford – as a native of London he has momentarily forgotten – and as a result he mistakenly expresses that it is raining in London. To those who maintain that speakers do not confuse the context of their utterances – maintaining, in effect, that our speaker would not forget – here we might ask what the intended extension of the term “speakers” is. If the scope is to include every speaker, then immediate counterexamples to this premise spring to mind, e.g., I suppose there are a number of people suffering from mental illness who do not even know where they are when they make an utterance. Perhaps the scope could be limited, as in fact Professor Schiffer suggests, to the “fluent, sane, and alert.” ¹⁵

Let us reconstruct the subargument in order to see if an adapted version of Professor Schiffer’s argument presents an impasse for the Contextualist.

3′. Knowledge claims are context-sensitive (2).

5′. With regard to context-sensitive claims, fluent, sane, and alert speakers [do not] confound the contexts in which their utterances are made.

6′. With regard to knowledge claims, fluent, sane, and alert speakers do not confound the contexts in which their utterances are made (3′,5′).

This argument, if it were sound, could, I think, undermine the Contextualist’s solution to the skeptical puzzle. However, the terms “fluent”, “sane,” and “alert” are sufficiently vague in
themselves and Professor Schiffer does not specify precisely what he means. And, unless Schiffer means to suggest that a speaker having the properties to which these terms refer is
infallible, 5′ is false. On occasion, speakers who are fluent, sane, and alert mistake their surroundings, circumstance, etc., and express a proposition which is aproposfor the context in which they thinkthey are, but which, unfortunately, is not aproposfor the context in which they are in fact. For example, for a moment I think I can make a declaration concerning my knowledge regarding a point in nineteenth-century history because I have forgotten that I am dealing with scholars of nineteenth century-history who require stricter criteria than my own. Subsequently, I learn differently. Here, likely, one will object that I was not alert when I made my declaration—I should have known with whom I was dealing. But if by “alert” is meant “not currently making a mistake,” then the question is completely begged in 5′, which, in effect, could be rendered as follows: 5′′. With regard to context-sensitive claims, fluent, sane, speakers, who do not make mistakes with regard to their context [do not] confound the contexts in which their utterances are made.

But 5′′ is clearly circular and therefore not a viable option. Since the reconstructed subargument above is clearly defective, it is difficult to see how any reconstruction of Professor Schiffer’s argument can establish the Contextualist’s solution as implausible.

So how does the contextual confusion described in the Trivial Pursuitexample compare in connection with the BIV hypothesis? I submit that some contexts are less familiar to us than others. The extent to which we use our hands within the context of our daily lives is, for those fortunate enough to have hands, enormous. Accordingly, we have an unquestioned belief in the existence of our hands almost every time we put them to use; and the number of times we put our hands to use is surely immense. In contrast, we don’t consider the BIV hypothesis very often. (Even for philosophers the number of times hands are employed greatly exceeds those occasions in which appeal to the BIV hypothesis is made. Consider the amount of administrative work you did last week instead of epistemology.) And, what is more, an increase in consideration vis-à-visthe BIV hypothesis can, as is consistent with the Contextualist’s account, result in an increase in appreciation of its strength. Hence, it does not seem implausible that when the BIV context is initially issued in, that we are quick to judge mistakenly “I know that I have hands” as “I know that I have hands while entertaining the BIV hypothesis,” since it is the common sense context rather than the BIV hypothesis with which we are overwhelmingly more familiar. Through
analysis, however, the bias which accompanies familiarity can be overcome. This, I submit, is the nature of the Contextualist’s solution to the skeptical puzzle. The idea that we are sometimes loath to accept the conclusion of the (SA), which we recognize to be both soundly arrived at and yet utterly unfamiliar to the intuitions we most frequently employ, is not, I submit, overly controversial.

In summary, for Professor Schiffer’s criticism of the Contextualist’s solution to have force, we must agree that it is not plausible that speakers or thinkers mistake the context in which they think and speak. But it is not implausible that we prima faciefail to recognize the full extent to which the standards issued in by the BIV hypothesis apply, and, subsequently, recognize the full extent to which the standards apply, once the Contextualist’s solution is understood. ¹⁶

Jeremy Kirby,
Teaching Assistant, Florida State University [email protected]

Works Cited
DeRose, Keith. “Solving the Skeptical Problem.” Philosophical Review 104.1 (1995): 1-51.

Hookway, Christopher. “Questions of Context.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96
(1996): 1-16.

Moore, G.E. “A Defense of Common Sense.” Contemporary Analytic and Linguistic Philosophies. Ed. E.D. Klemke. New York: Prometheus, 1983. 163-183.

Perry, John. “Thought Without Representation.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 60 (1986): 137-51.

Rieber, Stephen. “Skepticism and Contrastive Explanation.” Nous 32.2 (1998): 189-204.

Schiffer, Stephen. “Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1996): 317-333.

Endnotes:

Stephen Schiffer, “Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1996): 318.
This way of formulating the skeptical puzzle is in keeping with Schiffer’s treatment. It is also in keeping with Keith DeRose’s formulation in ‘Solving the Skeptical Problem,’ Philosophical Review 104 (1995): 1-51.
By ‘Moorean’ I simply mean of or pertaining to common sense, as G.E. Moore was the great defender of common sense in our era. C.f. his “Defense of Common Sense,” Contemporary Analytic and Linguistic Philosophies, ed. E.D. Klemke (New York: Prometheus, 1983) 1-51.
For a decisive rejection of the denial that knowledge is closed under known implication cf.Keith DeRose’s “Solving the Skeptical Problem.” The Philosophical Review 104 (1995): 27-29.
My discussion and understanding of context-sensitivity is based in large part on John Perry’s “Thought Without Representation,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 60 (1986): 137-51.
I have here borrowed and adapted an illustration which I particularly like from Christopher Hookway’s “Questions of Context,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1996): 1-16.
For this example, I am indebted to Christopher Hookway.
‘While entertaining the BIV hypothesis’ could be replaced with or should be seen in this paper as synonymous with ‘while more stringent standards are at work in virtue of the BIV hypothesis being appealed to.’
My intent vis-à-vis the first section of this paper is mainly exegetical. My aim in this section is limited to explaining the Contextualist’s solution and its appeal, with the overall purpose of handling specifically Stephen Schiffer’s criticism of the solution. For a straightforward and systematic defense of Contextualism see Stephen Rieber’s “Skepticism and Contrastive Explanation,” Nous 32 (1998): 189-204, as well as DeRose’s “Solving the Skeptical Puzzle,” Ibid.
Sic. Schiffer seems here to equate the [SA] with the paradox where I have heretofore made a distinction. His acknowledgment of the distinction is apparent in the lines that follow.
My italics.
The reader will notice that the term ‘think’ is found in my description of Schiffer’s description of the error theory but not in Schiffer’s. Perhaps Schiffer would find this objectionable. But I find no reason in his criticism of the Contextualist’s solution of the skeptical puzzle to think this the case. And the fact that there is an error occurring at all seems to presuppose that there is thinking, albeit incorrect thinking, going on.
Ibid. 326.
Heretofore, I have assumed that the skeptical puzzle is not merely a linguistic phenomenon. I am not sure whether this is an assumption Professor Schiffer shares. At any rate, a semantic theory which maintained that the skeptical puzzle is merely a linguistic phenomenon would not be the only semantic theory available to the Contextualist.
Ibid. 326.
After reading this paper the reader might wonder whether he knows that he has hands. The answer, of course, is no. For appeal has been made throughout to the “BIV Hypothesis.” However, the reader can, I think, acknowledge that in the nearest possible world, ceteris paribus, where the hypothesis is not on his mind, he knows that he has hands.