{"version":"1.0","provider_name":"Florida Philosophical Review","provider_url":"https:\/\/cah.ucf.edu\/fpr","author_name":"Florida Philosophical Review","author_url":"https:\/\/cah.ucf.edu\/fpr","title":"Answering Some Objections to Scientific Realism - Florida Philosophical Review","type":"rich","width":600,"height":338,"html":"<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"7zsOKbP7J8\"><a href=\"https:\/\/cah.ucf.edu\/fpr\/article\/answering-some-objections-to-scientific-realism\/\">Answering Some Objections to Scientific Realism<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" src=\"https:\/\/cah.ucf.edu\/fpr\/article\/answering-some-objections-to-scientific-realism\/embed\/#?secret=7zsOKbP7J8\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" title=\"&#8220;Answering Some Objections to Scientific Realism&#8221; &#8212; Florida Philosophical Review\" data-secret=\"7zsOKbP7J8\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\"><\/iframe><script type=\"text\/javascript\">\n\/* <![CDATA[ *\/\n\/*! This file is auto-generated *\/\n!function(d,l){\"use strict\";l.querySelector&&d.addEventListener&&\"undefined\"!=typeof URL&&(d.wp=d.wp||{},d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage||(d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage=function(e){var t=e.data;if((t||t.secret||t.message||t.value)&&!\/[^a-zA-Z0-9]\/.test(t.secret)){for(var s,r,n,a=l.querySelectorAll('iframe[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),o=l.querySelectorAll('blockquote[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),c=new RegExp(\"^https?:$\",\"i\"),i=0;i<o.length;i++)o[i].style.display=\"none\";for(i=0;i<a.length;i++)s=a[i],e.source===s.contentWindow&&(s.removeAttribute(\"style\"),\"height\"===t.message?(1e3<(r=parseInt(t.value,10))?r=1e3:~~r<200&&(r=200),s.height=r):\"link\"===t.message&&(r=new URL(s.getAttribute(\"src\")),n=new URL(t.value),c.test(n.protocol))&&n.host===r.host&&l.activeElement===s&&(d.top.location.href=t.value))}},d.addEventListener(\"message\",d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage,!1),l.addEventListener(\"DOMContentLoaded\",function(){for(var e,t,s=l.querySelectorAll(\"iframe.wp-embedded-content\"),r=0;r<s.length;r++)(t=(e=s[r]).getAttribute(\"data-secret\"))||(t=Math.random().toString(36).substring(2,12),e.src+=\"#?secret=\"+t,e.setAttribute(\"data-secret\",t)),e.contentWindow.postMessage({message:\"ready\",secret:t},\"*\")},!1)))}(window,document);\n\/\/# sourceURL=https:\/\/cah.ucf.edu\/fpr\/wp-includes\/js\/wp-embed.min.js\n\/* ]]> *\/\n<\/script>\n","description":"Brian Hood, University of Florida Answering Some Objections to Scientific Realism[1], Preliminaries This paper is a defense of Putnam\u2019s explanationist argument for scientific realism. Some have claimed that the explanationist defense has dubious hidden premises, e.g., science has always been \u201caiming for the truth\u201d. After pointing out problems for metaphysical realism, I consider internal realism [&hellip;]"}