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Florida Philosophical Review has its roots in the Florida Philosophical Association, one of the largest and most active regional philosophy associations in the United States. For several years, the Florida Philosophical Association envisioned a scholarly publication that would support the professional interaction of philosophers in Florida, the enhancement of philosophical education in Florida, and the development of philosophy both within and beyond Florida. *Florida Philosophical Review* realizes that vision and is committed to respecting and encouraging diverse philosophical interests and diverse philosophical approaches to issues while demonstrating the value of philosophy in the contemporary world.

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EDITORS' INTRODUCTION

Volume IV, Issue 1 of *Florida Philosophical Review*, the proceedings issue of the 49th Annual Meeting of the Florida Philosophical Association, includes the award winning graduate and undergraduate student papers by Jason Turner (Florida State University) and Dave Monroe (University of West Florida), Robert D'Amico's presidential address, and book symposia on Michael Ruse's *Darwin and Design: Does Evolution Have a Purpose?,* and Margaret McLaren's *Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity.*. Symposium participants include the authors of both books along with commentaries on *Darwin and Design* by Paul Draper (Florida State University) and Ronnie Hawkins (University of Central Florida). Commentaries on *Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity* are presented by Suzanne Jaeger (University of Central Florida) and Joanne Waugh (University of South Florida).

In the Presidential Address, "Philosophy: Any Defensible Province of its Own?", Bob D'Amico discusses the nature of philosophy and whether there is any problem or issue that belongs specifically, and exclusively, to philosophy. D'Amico wonders aloud about the role of the philosopher, about the status of post-modernism, and about the study of the history of philosophy. Without attempting to answer the question whether Philosophy has a province distinct from the other disciplines, D'Amico suggests that the question itself tells us something about philosophy in the twentieth century. One of the things that the question reveals, argues D'Amico, are the limitations of our existing classifications of philosophical traditions. Readers interested in the questions raised by D'Amico—following Quine and Carnap—concerning the nature, scope, and methods of philosophy and our descriptions of philosophical traditions are encouraged to examine the call for papers on the topic of metaphilosophy contained in this issue.

In "The Supervenience Argument," Jason Turner writes about the age-old concerns surrounding free will and determinism, libertarianism and compatibilism. Turner's position is essentially that libertarians (those who hold that humans have free will) cannot hold this position *and* hold also with naturalism. His contention is that the supervenience argument is a sister to the consequence argument (the libertarian's stronghold), and that to reject supervenience is to threaten the consequence argument *or* the naturalistic worldview, thus leading libertarians to inconsistent claims.

Dave Monroe, a recent graduate of the University of West Florida, writes an analysis of Bergman's film, *Persona*, dealing with the aesthetic question whether a unified plot may be discovered in it. He argues that, although *Persona* may appear to defy traditional analysis, it is possible to see the plot of the film play itself out not in linear form, but instead in character development. In this way, *Persona* plays itself out in ways reminiscent of the heroic journey of Joseph Campbell.

The book symposia in this issue are transcripts of lively discussions between authors, their commentators and audiences. In *Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity,* Margaret McLaren (Rollins College) discusses the relevance of Foucault's work to feminism and feminist philosophy, arguing that if Foucault's work is considered as a whole it can be seen as useful to feminists and other social critics. Foucault, she contends, encourages us to recognize ourselves as beings subject to social influences but not, however, determined by them. In addition to defending Foucault against feminist critics, McLaren uses Foucault's work to develop a theory of embodied, political subjectivity.

Suzanne Jaeger and Joanne Waugh comment on McLaren's work. Jaeger shares the skepticism of some feminists concerning the usefulness of Foucault to feminist projects. While not dismissing Foucault's contributions to social criticism, Jaeger is concerned with what she calls "residual monolithic assumptions in Foucault's account of social norms" and the related problem of aggression and violence in Foucault's account of the self's relation with others. She contrasts Foucault's version of the self in relation to that of Kelly Oliver, suggesting that Oliver's position is more compatible with feminist aims.

Waugh argues that criticisms of Foucault result from erroneous notions of language and meaning "that underlie liberal feminism as well as the epistemological and ethical projects inspired by the Enlightenment," suggesting that "Foucault's return to the ideas of Classical Antiquity in his later work proves to be corrective of these Enlightenment concepts." In support of McLaren's claim that Foucault's work must be considered in its entirety, Waugh argues that Foucault's later work is essential for developing a notion of subjectivity that is useful to contemporary feminist philosophers.

In *Darwin and Design: Does Evolution Have a Purpose?,* Michael Ruse (University of Florida) claims that there is a place for teleological thought after Darwin, and that it is possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist. In essence, Ruse claims that there is a place for evaluation in science and that there is a conception of good that can be understood without appeal to notions of purposive design. At the same time, Ruse attempts to understand arguments for design in their appropriate historical and social contexts.

In her response to Ruse, Hawkins discusses the nature of teleology generally, arguing that there is teleology in nature, all the way from human beings to the amoeba, and that teleological thinking is consistent with, and may even be required by, our obligation to preserve and protect the natural world. Hawkins' position, contra Ruse, is that purposiveness in nature is not just metaphorical—it is real in that all living beings create or exhibit a kind of "value" in attempting to maintain their lives.

Draper replies to Ruse's conception of the place of teleology in science by pointing out that Darwin's position does, in fact, have relevance to and provides support for the teleological argument

for God's existence in the sense that analogies from machines to the universe do seem to "work." He continues by discussing methodological naturalism, and his own adherence to a less stringent view of methodological naturalism, attempting to show that it is possible that the argument from design might be successful.

Concluding this issue are memorial essays for two Florida philosophers, both of whose lives touched many around them. In March 2004, Rob Brady of Stetson University died unexpectedly of complications from surgery. Rob attended the meeting of the Florida Philosophical Association in November 2003, talking about his recent excursions on land and by sea, engaging others in various conversations, and otherwise appearing to enjoy, as he always seemed to do, the FPA meeting. No one suspected that this would be Rob's last meeting, and thus the last time that his friends at the Florida Philosophical Association would ever see him. His unexpected passing reminds us how tenuous is our hold on life, and how important it is to live it to its fullest. Rob Brady's own life, to which the essay by his friend and colleague Ron Hall testifies, did live a full life, making time to be author, friend, devoted husband, teacher, colleague, traveler—and more.

Two weeks prior to the publication of this issue of *Florida Philosophical Review*, one of our colleagues here at the University of Central Florida, Stephen B. Levensohn, died of congestive heart failure. Steve Levensohn, AKA "Harriet", lived a colorful and interesting life. He was an avid reader, devoted father, popular teacher, respected colleague, doting grandfather, good friend to many, and our friend. He delighted all of us at the University of Central Florida with his wit, style, wisdom, and friendship. He affected the lives of literally thousands of students in 35 years of teaching at UCF, and showed those of us among the faculty what it is to care for one's colleagues, to care for one's students, and to care for the discipline in a uniquely Steve Levensohn-like way. His gravelly voice, infectious smile, sharp wit, and especially his care and concern for others, will be missed by us all.

Shelley M. Park and Nancy A. Stanlick, Editors
Florida Philosophical Review: The Journal of the Florida Philosophical Association
June 30, 2004

In Memoriam
Rob R. Brady, 1941-2004

Rob R. Brady, Professor of Philosophy at Stetson University, DeLand, Florida, died on March 1, 2004, at Florida Hospital in DeLand. Professor Brady, a longtime active member of the Florida Philosophical Association and its President in 1987, had taught at Stetson University for 32 years. He was 62.

A native of Natchez, Mississippi, Professor Brady came to Stetson in 1972. After receiving a bachelor's degree in humanities from the University of California at Berkeley in 1963, Professor Brady continued his education, first enrolling at The New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary and then transferring to Harvard Divinity School where, in 1967, he received his bachelor's degree in sacred theology. In 1975 he completed a doctorate in philosophy at Claremont Graduate University.

After graduating from Harvard Divinity School, Professor Brady worked for a short time as a self-taught systems analyst at the Bank of America. This experience laid the groundwork for Professor Brady's subsequent work in the field of logic. After returning to philosophy at Claremont and upon becoming ABD, he joined the Philosophy Department at Stetson. For the next 32 years, Professor Brady combined his love of teaching with his ability to make technology work for students. In the late 1980s, Professor Brady developed a computer program he called *The LogicWorks*. Soon after, this computer-based program became used internationally in the teaching of logic at the university level. In 2002, he changed the original DOS program into a Windows®-based interactive, multimedia logic course on CD-ROM. He called this new version *LogicWorks: The Next Generation*. Professor Ronald L. Hall, a colleague at Stetson, later contributed a text for this multimedia course in logic.

In addition to his interest in logic, Professor Brady's teaching interests focused on the work of Wittgenstein and in the field of ethics, with a special interest in issues of war and peace. Outside of the classroom, Professor Brady had a wide variety of interests, including the martial arts, sailing and travel. He was a black belt in judo and taught the sport to Stetson students for many years. Professor Brady was the proud Captain of his own sail boat, named "Summer's Door" and during an extended leave of absence in the late 1990s, he and Betty, his wife of 40 years, spent two years sailing the Atlantic coast and the Caribbean Sea. Last summer, a newly acquired RV enabled the Bradys to meander—their preferred laid-back pace—to the mountains of the West that they both loved so much. On such trips, these two best friends would hike, take pictures, and simply enjoy the pleasure of one another's company. Their latest adventure (this past fall) was to Australia.

Memorial donations may be made to The Lawson Endowed Lecture Series at Stetson University, University Relations, 421 N. Woodland Blvd., Unit 8279, DeLand, FL 32723. (The Lawson Lectures, named in honor of Father Leroy Lawson, a long-time Visiting Professor of Philosophy at Stetson, is a newly endowed series of lectures in Philosophy and Human Values. The inaugural series will be held in the 2004-2005 academic year.)

Ronald L. Hall
Stetson University

"Philosophy: Any Defensible Province of Its Own?"

Presidential Address of the 49th Annual Meeting
of the Florida Philosophical Association

Robert D'Amico, *University of Florida*

I will explain my somewhat odd choice of title in a moment. But let me begin with some words of thanks. I want to thank Nate Andersen and Eckerd College for hosting the 49th meeting of the Florida Philosophical Association. It is a lovely venue for this conference. And a special thanks goes to Shelley Park for organizing this superb program and pulling it off with such apparent ease. Finally, and I fear this is a much too belated thank you, let me recognize Sally Ferguson whose contributions have been invaluable as secretary of our organization, and I worry over how near that possible world is in which she is no longer secretary of the Florida Philosophical Association.

A presidential address of this sort has its own special problems and all the more so for the discipline of philosophy. I suppose I envisage such a talk as somewhat on the model of an after-dinner drink—what Italians helpfully call a "digestivo." Such a drink and such an address, if either lives up to its name, should have the following qualities—short, an agreeable but nevertheless interesting after-taste, no stomach upset (the expressive term for that unwished for after-dinner result in Italian is "agida") and, most importantly, not put one's audience to sleep.

There may simply be no such talk and specifically no such talk for philosophy. Philosophers were put on earth, I suspect, to cause irritation to themselves and others, often by assaults through length and tedium (you can see how difficult it is to avoid the "agida-effect"). But, as you will see, what philosophers do is actually part of my topic this evening—so there is nothing more to say by way of making excuses in advance, I'll just jump into it—by the way did I mention "short?"

First let me make the title somewhat less strange by offering the very passage that inspired my choice of words. I won't say who wrote it for at least a moment, so you can hear it without knowing its author. It dates from 1934.

> In all our general thinking, whether with metaphysics itself or in the natural sciences … we seem invariably to come upon some philosophic, non-empirical problem which cannot be permanently swept away.[1]

As we will see in a moment, the author identifies this with the question of whether there is a "defensible province" for philosophy. It is a question so close, so nearby that it does not easily

come into focus, but at the same time somewhat of an embarrassment when it does. It is also a question prone to elicit groans of "not that again!" I cannot answer this question this evening (you will be relieved to hear), maybe never, nor even begin to answer it this evening. Rather, the task this evening is to ask it anew, hopefully somehow afresh (these kind of questions have a way of being so near they get tired and stale) and perhaps to say a few words about why and how to ask it.

The question is, specifically, whether there is an inquiry that falls to the discipline of philosophy alone and that philosophy has the authority to carry out—not the sciences, not common sense, not religion, not poetry, not literary criticism, not sociology or psychology—a province such that philosophy is not simply a chapter in the textbook of these other disciplines.

What other discipline seriously asks such a question? Furthermore, to ask seriously such a question, for it not to be simply taken for granted that there is such a province and such authority (how even to begin, we might wonder, without having a subject matter taken for granted?) is to perhaps already betray that the answer is "no." The suspicion is that if one asks such a question, one already knows the answer. It is this sense of philosophy as deeply, irremediably and utterly adrift, in doubt of itself so fundamentally, that likely inspires the knee-jerk anti-philosophical mood so prevalent these days. Maybe those among us who think the answer is not obviously "no" or who think there is a philosophical task neither spiritualists nor scientists can do, can take some solace in how recent it is that we find ourselves perplexed by this basic question. But it does give one pause—especially when the expressions of bitterest contempt for philosophy's autonomy come from inside.

These currently fashionable anti-philosophical "riffs" form a somewhat monotonous chorus themselves.

Either:

Philosophy once and for all abandons this forlorn conception itself as a separate discipline and finally disappears into the work of the natural, social and/or biological sciences (a position so pervasive and capable of so many variations that it warrants its own ugly name these days—"eliminativism" or worse "eliminative naturalism").

Or:

Philosophy embraces and affirms its status as a non-discipline. Not having a genuine subject matter is not the occasion for any serious reflection, rather it is the occasion for self-promotion. Philosophy becomes a transgressive inquiry freed from those illusory boundaries and foundations, glorying in the intellectual promiscuity that was once its shame (a position so pervasive and capable of so many variations that it warrants its own ugly name these days— "post-modernism").

I am getting ahead of myself here (and perhaps being unfair to hosts of unnamed fellow scribblers, but then I am allowed such liberties given my role this evening). I should now reveal the author of the above quotation. It is Quine from his 1934 lecture series on Carnap. I think the quotation is a bit of a surprise, and I think the whole lecture series quite brilliant, if largely unread.

In confirmation of my comment about the nearest questions being hardest to focus upon, it seems that those early decades of the last century—so critical to our current philosophical understanding—remain a virtual *terra incognita* combined of equal portions of our inability often to simply read what is in front of our eyes or to see the forest for the trees (I will stop with tired perception metaphors now). Of course, I do not quote Quine above while simultaneously trying to induce in you and myself amnesia as to what came later—we always read, in the way I am trying to get at tonight, while aware of what comes later.

Later in the lectures Quine says the following about what he understands to be Carnap's central project:

> Carnap's purpose is not merely to advance a negative doctrine, not to construe philosophy as trivial: his concern is rather to clear away confusion and lay the foundation of [an] . . . analysis, criticism and refinement of the methods and the concepts of science that Carnap regards as the *defensible province* of philosophy. [2]

We thus have the other part of my title for this lecture.

Quine's discussion is surprisingly fresh, historically informed, guided by great charity toward Carnap, and precocious (in 1934 Quine was 29). But a full discussion of this work is of course for another day, as I am admitting is a full discussion of the question. I introduced this aside concerning a young Quine discussing Carnap so that I may put the following different slant on the question I cannot answer this evening.

Does the question tell us something about philosophy in the twentieth century that we continue to miss? I believe it does so and I want to say a few words about that point while not axe-grinding for any specific philosophical view (even though, as the dialectic of this topic demands, a philosophical view is required to answer fully the question of the status of philosophy). There is a comment by Charles Sanders Peirce that I always liked. In one of his lectures he stops to warn his audience—"people who want philosophy ladled out to them can get it elsewhere. There are philosophical soup shops at every corner, thank God!"[3] Since we don't live in New York City the claim about soup shops on every corner is an anachronism, but we all know precisely what he means. Thus I'll not ladle out soup this evening (and hopefully that is the last of the food metaphors).

It is hard now to recall fully or to understand fully the anger—perhaps it was all displaced anger—that once raged about studying the history of philosophy. I know part of this from experience, but also from those of a previous generation who hit it full blast when they entered graduate school in the late 1950s and early 1960s where, as was once said to me, "being caught reading anything in the history of philosophy was the equivalent of being caught reading pornography."

In a volume called *Owl of Minerva*, a collection of philosophers reflecting upon philosophy (a guaranteed cure for insomnia if there ever was one), there is a strange, even somewhat hallucinatory essay by Paul Ziff, "How I see Philosophy." I am fairly sure these mere three pages by Ziff cannot be understood properly today, at least not by those who either did not understand of what Ziff is making fun or cannot reconstruct the context of the way in which it is written. Ziff in part makes fun of the names of past philosophers. Here is just a bit of it, to get its flavor:

> Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite Meister Eckhart Maimonides Godël Peirce Little Orphan Annie Gregory Thamaturgogo Herbrand Skolem the Green Hornet and the Shadow. Because it's not what one reads but what one makes of it? So we need and we gotta hab a deep hole foh to put in all de deep thinkers. Who we put in furst? It doan mattuh. Dump dem in! Der goes Kiekeebore. Bye Begel! So long Sartre! Dig dat Highdigger![4]

You get the idea. For those who know and love the world of New York City ethnic intellectual life, it is immediately recognizable as the Yiddish "history-schmistory" response.

Though this "goodbye to all that" tone dismissing an enfeebled and much worse enfeebling past is now largely out of fashion, I am just as concerned (maybe more concerned now) with the way in which the study of the history of philosophy is often defended these days. It is unhelpful and misguided to entangle the study of the history of philosophy with quite extraordinary claims for its power to solve philosophical problems or to confront us with imagined problems with respect to such study—all promoted for what I fear are poor reasons. Let me just list some examples, again unfairly.

There is some pervasive worry about the need for a methodology for such studies that occasions the use of the term "hermeneutics": and it consists of advice that sounds a lot like the following: "you have to read the whole book and understand who and what its author is talking about before you can understand any one sentence in the book, but of course you can only begin reading it a sentence at a time." Yes, I see. There is also now a widespread flirtation with a kind of skepticism denying that we can understand any other philosopher or any other text (to be more fashionable for the moment). There are also very grandiose claims of purported sociological, economic and even biological explanations for the philosophical positions once held—claims for

which "uncharitable" hardly seems strong enough. Instead of wearing out my welcome here by doing my own version of a "hermeneutics-schmermeneutics" response to all this, let me give an example of what I mean by this misleading conception of the history of philosophy by returning to both Carnap and my original question.

Peter Gallison, historian of science, intellectual historian, and philosopher of science, in "Constructing the Modern: The Cultural Locution of *Aufbau*" claims we deeply misunderstand Carnap's term *Aufbau* (you will also note that the gerund in the title marks this essay as properly *au courant*). Specifically, Gallison claims,

> [T]ranslating *Aufbau* as 'rebuilding' or 'reconstruction' fails to capture the novelty of what these many authors [reported in the article is Gallison's research in journal articles between 1919 and 1927] hoped would come to pass. On new, and for the first time firm foundations, they would erect a political, philosophical and aesthetic world separate from everything that had come before. It would (in most instances) be socialist, internationalist, practical, and deeply scientific and technological. As a shorthand designation, I will refer to this cluster of usages as the left-technocratic period of *Aufbau*.[5]

There is much more to say—not for tonight, alas—and even Gallison concedes there are concerns about precisely what he has shown in the article. He admits that he has not given a conceptual analysis, and that seems right since little discussion of Carnap's work is found in the article. Nor does he provide a causal analysis, and I have already said what I think of such efforts. But he does claim that he has discovered this famous philosophical work's "cultural meaning." He describes cultural meanings as not "entirely aleatory," but also neither "fixed forever" nor "arbitrarily chosen."[6]

Being of a somewhat simpler mind I pose a much simpler problem concerning Gallison's essay than these complicated and of course important questions bothering him. Is Gallison correct about what Carnap's philosophical project was? Gallison leaves it implicit but appears to assume throughout that Carnap hoped to carry out a "phenomenalist reduction" in support of logical empiricism in *The Logical Structure of the World.* This picture of the book is of course the view of the older Quine, but we can see the seeds of an alternative view in the young Quine I began discussing. Perhaps Carnap wrote the *Aufbau* while remaining neutral between philosophical positions hoping, in that way, to craft a language that could adjudicate philosophical arguments.

I am not treating this issue as settled; it is of course like many such interpretative problems open to further debate, but I am stressing that Gallison's project simply misses the mark by begging or avoiding such a central question. The basic question it fails to ask about Carnap's book and career is a variant or cousin of my question this evening.

To conclude: our recent past has been understood for many decades now as a divide between or a quarrel between two traditions, analytic and continental philosophy. I will not make comments about what is lacking in such a contrast and what has become furthermore an extremely tired story these days. (After all, saying that there were "empiricists" and "rationalists" in the 17th century is not *wholly wrong*, it's simply deeply wrong-headed.) My point is that the landscape of that century which landed us in the present changes quite dramatically if my question is posed first and foremost. For instance, some who are classified in these two different traditions turn out, from the vantage point of my question, to be in fundamental agreement—and some of those classified in the same tradition turn out to be in fundamental disagreement. I find that interesting.

I have done what I can for now—but let me close by evoking the memory of the Presidential addresses of my friends and colleagues Aron Edidon and Kirk Ludwig, with this final, barely rhyming couplet:

Having struggled to sketch philosophy's arc,
In relief, I pass this gavel to Shelley Park.

Notes

[1] W.V.O. Quine, *Dear Carnap, Dean Van: The Quine-Carnap Correspondence and Related Work*, ed. Richard Creath (Berkeley: U of California P, 1980): 88.

[2] Quine 102-103.

[3] Milton, Munitz, *Contemporary Analytic Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1981): 26.

[4] Paul Ziff. "How I See Philosophy," *Owl of Minerva*, eds. Charles J. Bontempo and S. Jack Odell (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975): 224-225.

[5] Peter Gallison, "Constructing Modernism: The Cultural Location of *Aufbau*," *Origins of Logical Empiricism. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science,* vol. XVI, eds. Ronald N. Giere and Alan W. Richardson (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1996): 17.

[6] Gallison 41.

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The Supervenience Argument

Graduate Essay Prize Winning Paper
of the 49th Annual Meeting of the
Florida Philosophical Association

Jason Turner, *Florida State University*

The *Consequence Argument* has long been a staple in the defense of *libertarianism*, the view that free will is incompatible with causal determinism and that humans have free will. It is generally (but not universally) held that libertarianism is consistent with a certain naturalistic view of the world—that is, that (given quantum indeterminacy) libertarian free will can be accommodated without the postulation of entities or events which neither are identical to nor supervene on something physical. In this paper, I argue that libertarians who support their view with the Consequence Argument are forced to reject this naturalistic worldview, since the Consequence Argument has a sister argument, which I call the *Supervenience Argument*, that cannot be rejected without threatening either the Consequence Argument or the naturalistic worldview in question.

The Consequence Argument

The *Consequence Argument* purports to show that free will is incompatible with causal determinism, where the latter thesis is understood as the claim that the laws of nature, conjoined with any proposition accurately describing the entire state of the world at some given time, entail any other true proposition. An informal version of the argument runs as follows:

> If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us.[1]

If the argument is sound, determinism is incompatible with free will.

This argument can be clothed in formal garb. This garb makes use of a modal operator, 'N', where 'Nφ' is to be read, 'φ, and no one has, or ever had, any choice about whether φ'.[2] I will follow Alicia Finch and Ted A. Warfield as understanding 'someone has a choice about φ' to mean 'someone could have acted so as to ensure the falsity of φ.'[3] The argument also makes use of three propositional symbols and one inference rule. The symbol '*P*' stands for a proposition that expresses the state of a world at a remotely early time (before there were any human agents, say), '*L*,' a conjunction of all the laws of nature, and '*F*,' any true proposition. The inference rule is often called the *Transfer Principle*, or just *Transfer*:

(T) From Nφ and □(φ → ψ), deduce Nψ, where '□' represents broad logical necessity.

The argument follows:

The Consequence Argument

(1) N(*P* & *L*)	Premise
(2) □((*P* & *L*) → *F*)	Assumption of Determinism
(3) N*F*	T: 1, 2

Recall that *F* could be any true proposition whatsoever. Thus, if determinism is true (and if no one has, or ever had, a choice about the truth of the conjunction of the laws of nature with a proposition expressing the state of the world in the remote past), then no one has ever had a choice about anything.[4]

What of the first premise? It is highly intuitive that we cannot do anything to change the laws of nature—i.e., we cannot do anything that would ensure the falsity of the laws (and hence we 'have no choice' about them)—and it is likewise intuitive that we cannot do anything to change the past.[5] It seems intuitive that, as a result, we have no choice about the conjunction of these two propositions.

We must not be too hasty. Thomas McKay and David Johnson have shown that the N-operator is not agglomerative—we cannot infer 'N(φ & ψ)' from 'Nφ' and 'Nψ.'[6] In their example, we consider an agent who does not flip a coin, but could have. In this case, 'N(*the coin does not land heads*)' is true, and 'N(*the coin does not land tails*)' is true—to falsify either of these claims, one would have to ensure that a coin land heads or tails. Yet 'N(*the coin does not land heads* & *the coin does not land tails*)' is false. The agent could have falsified the embedded conjunction by flipping the coin. Thus, we cannot infer 'N(*P* & *L*)' directly from 'N*P*' and 'N*L*.'

While this is formally correct, it may not be much of an obstacle; (1) does not seem to be a plausible candidate for rejection, even given the general invalidity of N-agglomeration. Finch and Warfield describe it this way:

> [T]he core intuition [described above] motivates the acceptance of [the first] premise. This core intuition is, we maintain, the intuition that the past is fixed and beyond the power of human agents to affect in any way. *P* describes the state of the world at some time in the distant past (before any human agents existed). *L* is a conjunction of the laws of nature which, we presume, in addition to being inalterable by human agents, do not change over time. Thus the conjunction (*P* & *L*) offers a description of what might be called the "broad past"—the complete state of the world at a time in the distant past including the laws of nature. We maintain, in asserting our premise, that the broad past is fixed [in a way that justifies N(*P* & *L*)].[7]

Thus we need not appeal to agglomeration to justify 'N(*P* & *L*)' given our intuitions that 'N*P*' and 'N*L*' are true, because those intuitions *directly* support 'N(*P* & *L*)' without any formal mediation.

The Supervenience Argument

There is a view about the nature of reality, which I will tag with the over-worked name of *Naturalism*, which in rough form holds that everything around us eventually boils down to fundamental physics. This is not necessarily a reductionistic view (although global reductionism is one variant of Naturalism), but rather a supervenience thesis that holds that every event supervenes on the microphysical. We can distinguish two versions of the thesis—the *Strong* and the *Weak*. The former holds that the supervenience relation is one of *logical* supervenience—that is, any two possible worlds that differ with respect to which events occur in them differ with respect to which microphysical events occur as well. The latter requires only that the supervenience relation be *nomic*, so that any two possible worlds with divergent events have *either* divergent microphysical events *or* divergent laws of nature.

The *Supervenience Argument* is designed to show that, if Weak Naturalism is true, the class of actions about which someone has or ever had a choice is empty. As with the Consequence Argument, there is an informal version of the Supervenience Argument:

> If weak naturalism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature, events in the remote past, and the outcomes of undetermined microphysical events. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, what the laws of nature are, or how undetermined

> microphysical events turn out. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us.

The next step is to clothe the Supervenience Argument in the same formal robes worn by the Consequence Argument. For stylistic reasons, throughout this paper italicized lower-case letters will refer to particular events (including actions) and their upper-case counterparts will refer to propositions that express the events' occurrences. For instance, if *a* is an event, then '*A*' is the proposition expressing the occurrence of *a*. Likewise, if there is a group of events designated as 'the *b*s,' '*B*' will be the proposition that all of the *b*s occurred. (Of course, not all propositions have corresponding lower-case events—'*L*,' for instance, does not.) All events are to be understood as particular event tokens, unless otherwise indicated.

Choosy Actions

Call an event *a choosy* if and only if '*A* & ~N*A*' is true. If there are any choosy events, there is a first one. Furthermore, this event should be an action. It seems as though the only way a non-action event could have been the first choosy action would be if some omission allowed the event to occur, and the agent had a choice about the omission. But, plausibly, even if omissions are not actions (I do not wish to commit myself either way on this issue here), there would have been some other action the agent did perform which she would not have performed had she not allowed the omission. Suppose, for instance, that Jane failed to press a button that, had she pressed it, would have kept thousands of gallons of toxic waste from being spilled in the ocean. It seems likely that there is *some* action she performed which she would not have performed if she had pressed the button instead. Perhaps this action is an overtly physical action, such as walking past the button instead of turning toward it. More likely, it is a mental action like deciding not to press the button. Either way, the first choosy event is an action.

There are two minor wrinkles, both of which deal with ties. First, on one popular account of action-individuation, a single bodily movement may comprise a large number of actions, and an individual may perform multiple actions simultaneously. Thus there would be no *first* choosy action, because the first time someone acts in a choosy manner, there will be *many* actions that all begin simultaneously. We may accommodate this fine-grained account of action-individuation by a little formal maneuvering. Suppose that, at a time *t*, an agent *S*'s behavior counts as multiple actions on a fine-grained account of action but as a single action on a coarse-grained account. Clearly, even for the fine-grained theorist, the actions *S* performed at *t* bear some sort of similarity to each other that they do not bear to *other* actions performed by *S* at *t*, or to actions performed by other agents (whether at *t* or not). So we can shift our discussion from that of *actions* to that of *equivalence classes* of actions (using this similarity relation), and argue that the set of equivalence classes of choosy actions

must have a first member. For stylistic reasons, the coarse-grained way of speaking will be used for the balance of this paper; for my purposes, talking of equivalence classes of actions will add complication without enlightenment.

Considerations of action-individuation aside, there is still the potential for genuine ties for the first choosy action. If two choosy actions *a* and *b* are performed simultaneously, and there are no choosy actions that occur before *a* and *b*, then the class of choosy actions will not have a first element. For our purposes, however, we will be able to get by with an artificially restricted notion of 'first.' For instance, we can say that whichever of *a* or *b* is highest and closest from the northeast to the intersection of the international date line, the equator, and sea level, is the 'first' element of the class—and it is not possible that there be any ties in *this* competition.

Our purpose in locating a 'first' element of the class of choosy actions is to allow us to argue that the class of choosy actions is empty. We do this by showing that the first class of choosy actions is not choosy. (The argument has the form of a *reductio*: suppose the class is non-empty. Then it has a first element, which is choosy. But that element is not choosy. Thus the class is empty.) In order to make the argument work, we need only an ordering with the following properties: (a) for every set *S* of choosy actions, *S* has a first element, and (b) if *a* occurs 'before' *b*, then *b* cannot be causally relevant to *a*. Clearly, our artificial ordering satisfies both of these properties, so it is suited to do the work we need it to. (Likewise, for those worried that general relativity will throw a spanner into the works, we can arbitrarily pick a frame of reference for our ordering to operate within without violating either of the needed conditions.)

The Argument—A First Pass

If there are some free actions, there are some choosy ones; and if there are some choosy ones, there is a first choosy one. Call it *r*, and suppose it was performed by an agent *S*. For illustration, suppose that the causal theory of action is true. Then *r*, by virtue of being an action, will have been caused by some particular pair of desires and beliefs, which I will call *db*. But *db* probably will not encompass all of the causes of *r*—causal theorists seldom think that a belief/desire pair alone is nomically sufficient for an action. Other inner states of the agent, as well as external, environmental factors, etc., may figure into the causal story. So let db^+ represent the sum total of what we would call the causes of *r* if we knew enough about *r*'s production.

Now, libertarians will hasten at this point to remind us that, if we accept the causal theory of action and are talking about free (or choosy) actions, the causal chain between an action and its causes had better be *indeterministic*. So we shall suppose it is. By the Weak Naturalistic thesis, though, this indeterminism is only going to get in to the picture from the 'ground up'—via microphysical undetermined events.

For the sake of illustration, suppose that somewhere in the causal chain between db^+ and *r* a particle gained the property *e*+ but was not determined to do so. Then *r* was only indeterministically caused by db^+. But if *in* is the undetermined event in question—the gaining of a particle of the property *e*+—then *r* will supervene on db^+ and *in*. In general, there may be a large number of such undetermined events in the causal chain; we will let '*in*' stand for the entire collection of these events.

It is clear that *r* will supervene (nomically) on db^+ and *in*. In other words, it is not possible that db^+ and *in* occur, the laws of nature remain the same, and *r* not occur. Recalling that DB^+, *IN*, and *R* express the respective occurrences of db^+, *in*, and *r*, we note the following formal equivalencies of the supervenience thesis:

$\sim\Diamond((DB^+ \,\&\, IN \,\&\, L) \,\&\, \sim R)$	Supervenience Thesis
$\Box\sim((DB^+ \,\&\, IN \,\&\, L) \,\&\, \sim R)$	Df. $\Diamond$
$\Box((DB^+ \,\&\, IN \,\&\, L) \rightarrow R)$	Truth-functional Equivalence

This final version of nomic supervenience will serve as the second premise in our argument.

The first premise is that no one has, or ever had, a choice about whether DB^+ & *IN* & *L*. This seems to follow from the 'broad past' principle appealed to with respect to the Consequence Argument. In that instance, the intuitions supporting 'N(*P* & *L*)' were that both '*P*' and '*L*' were true long before there were any humans around and that the past is fixed. Apparently, the idea is that, since '*P* & *L*' was true before anyone could have done anything to falsify it, and since we cannot *now* do anything to falsify what has gone on before, nothing we can now do could falsify '*P* & *L*.'

Similar reasoning lends support to 'N(DB^+ & *IN* & *L*).' The proposition 'DB^+ & *IN* & *L*' is made true *before r occurs*, and *r* is the first choosy act. Thus, nobody could have done anything to falsify it *at the time it was made true* (since if they could have, *r* would not have been the first choosy act), and by the time *r* comes around, DB^+ & *IN* & *L* is already a fixed part of the past.

Of course, one may object that DB^+ & *IN* & *L* is not part of the *remote* past, since it occurs very soon before *r*. This appeal to the remoteness of the past is a red herring. It is not as though we think the recent past is only somewhat fixed, and we can change it a bit, whereas as time goes on it 'solidifies' until it is eventually unchangeable. Rather, *the past*—remote or not—cannot be changed by *anything we can do now*. The only reason to appeal to a 'remote' past in defense of the Consequence Argument is to make sure that we do not appeal to a time at which people (not necessarily we) were going around performing choosy actions. If our proposition is made true before the first choosy action, though, we are in the clear. We are now ready for the argument.

The Supervenience Argument

(1) N(DB^+ & *IN* & *L*)	Premise
(2) □((DB^+ & *IN* & *L*) → *R*)	Premise
(3) N*R*	T: 1, 2

Thus, *r* is not a choosy act; so there are no choosy acts at all. No one has, or ever had, a choice about anything.

The Argument for Trickier Cases

My claim that 'DB^+ & *IN* & *L*' is made true entirely *before r* occurs may raise a few eyebrows. There is one way in which it could be false. Notice that there are two ways in which an event *e* may be caused only indeterministically by a cause *c*. On the one hand, there may be a causal chain between *c* and *e* that contains indeterministic links 'somewhere in the middle,' as it were. But there may instead be a causal chain from *c* up to but not including *e* in which *e itself* is the undetermined link. This means that there could be two possible worlds (with the same laws of nature) in which the entire causal chain strictly *between c* and *e* occurred, but *e* only occurs in one of them. I have assumed that the causal chain between db^+ and *r* is the first sort of undetermined link, where the indeterminism crops up in the middle. If the link between db^+ and *r* is the second sort of chain, then I face a dilemma. Either *r* is *not* one of the *in*s, in which case premise (2) is false, or *r is* one of the *in*s, in which case premise (1) begs the question by including '*R*' as a hidden conjunct of a proposition bounded by the 'N' operator.

It is implausible that *r* is a microphysical event. Such events are, in general, too small to be actions. Since the occurrence or non-occurrence of *r* will have to supervene on something microphysical (by our Naturalistic hypothesis), and since *r* was undetermined by everything that went on *before* it, there must be some undetermined microphysical event *x*, concurrent with *r*, that *r* supervenes on. In other words, *x* is the microphysical event that 'makes the difference' between the occurrence and non-occurrence of *r*. (There may be more than one such event; call them the *x*s, collectively.)

Of course, the *x*s will not be *r*'s entire supervenience base. There will probably be other events that *r* supervenes on that *were* determined by events preceding *r*. Of these events, we will call the ones that were caused by db^+ the *y*s, and the ones that were not, the *z*s.

Let *e* represent the collection of events that were nomically sufficient for the *z*s. (Some of the *e*s themselves may have been undetermined, but this will not make any difference since the *e*s all occurred before *r*.) Also, let the *x*s be separate from the *in*s. Now consider the proposition 'DB^+ & *IN* & *L* & *E*.' Once again, it should be clear that nobody has, or ever had, a choice about this proposition, for it was made true by the laws of nature and events that occurred in the 'broad past,' before any choosy actions. Thus, N(DB^+ & *IN* & *L* & *E*).

Likewise, it appears as though nobody has, or ever had, any choice about X, the proposition that expresses the occurrence of the xs. This is trickier, but it does seem that nobody could have done anything such that, had they done it, X would have been false. How could anyone exercise such control over the truly objective chance happenings of particle physics? What could I do, for instance, to ensure that an electron will have a certain property at a certain time, if it is *objectively undetermined* whether or not it will gain said property?

As far as I can see, there is nothing I (or anyone) could do that would determine the outcome of an undetermined event. What I would *like* to do is combine $\mathrm{N}(DB^{+} \,\&\, IN \,\&\, L \,\&\, E)$ with $\mathrm{N}X$, which would allow me to offer the following argument.

The Tricky Supervenience Argument

(1) $\mathrm{N}(DB^{+} \,\&\, IN \,\&\, L \,\&\, E \,\&\, X)$	Premise
(2) $\Box((DB^{+} \,\&\, IN \,\&\, L \,\&\, E \,\&\, X) \rightarrow (L \,\&\, X \,\&\, Y \,\&\, Z))$	Premise
(3) $\mathrm{N}(L \,\&\, X \,\&\, Y \,\&\, Z)$	T: 1, 2
(4) $\Box((L \,\&\, X \,\&\, Y \,\&\, Z) \rightarrow R)$	Premise (Supervenience of R)
(5) $\mathrm{N}R$	T: 3, 4

The second premise is unproblematic: $DB^{+} \,\&\, L \,\&\, IN$ entails Y, since the ys are caused by db^{+}; $L \,\&\, E$ entails Z, since the es deterministically cause the zs; and $L \,\&\, X$ trivially entails $L \,\&\, X$. The problem is that I cannot simply agglomerate the first premise, and X does not lie in the 'broad past' of r.

Nonetheless, I claim that $\mathrm{N}(DB^{+} \,\&\, IN \,\&\, L \,\&\, E \,\&\, X)$ is true. According to Finch and Warfield,

> [I]t is important to be clear that the McKay and Johnson argument [against agglomeration] shows only that the inference from Np and Nq to N(p & q) is invalid. This does not, by itself, provide any reason at all for thinking that [in the case of NP and NL] NP and NL are true, while N(P & L) is not. An inspection of the difference [between the two cases] shows that the McKay/Johnson case seems to cast no doubt on the truth of N(P & L). In the McKay/Johnson case, one has no choice about either conjunct of a conjunction but does have control over the conjunction because although there is nothing one can do that would falsify either particular conjunct there is something one can do that *might* falsify either conjunct and *would* falsify the conjunction. . . . [I]t is not at all plausible that though one cannot, for example, do anything that *would* falsify… the laws of nature, one *might* somehow do so.[8]

Similar remarks apply here. There is nothing one could do that even *might* falsify the occurrence of the *x*s, the truly undetermined events,[9] nor is there anything one could do that even *might* falsify the past.[10] Thus, there is not anything one could do that would falsify their conjunction. Premise (1) is vindicated and the argument follows.

Implications

Naturally, libertarians will want to reject the conclusion of the argument, for they believe in the existence of free will. The most obvious candidate for rejection is the supervenience thesis. Since this follows from Weak Naturalism, a libertartian who escapes the argument by this route concedes that free will is incompatible with Weak Naturalism after all.

Some libertarians already think free will and Naturalism are incompatible; such theorists will undoubtedly welcome this argument.[11] Others[12] seek to locate the indeterminism needed for free will at the level of indeterminacies in nature; for them, the argument is not so welcome, for it directly concerns their theories of free will.

If rejection of Weak Naturalism is required in order to make libertarian free will work, some may feel it is not worth the effort. Weak Naturalism, for better or worse, is a widely held view. In the arena of philosophical debate, positions are evaluated both on their logical merits and their plausibility. For those who are committed to naturalism, the implausibility of the denial of Weak Naturalism is likely to outweigh whatever intuitive support the libertarian position may have. When faced with the Supervenience Argument, those initially drawn towards libertarianism by the Consequence Argument may be inclined to either find fault with that argument (and thus lean towards compatibilism) or give up on free will altogether.

The point can be put another way. Many who accept the libertarian position do so only because of the plausibility available to it via naturalistic means. Some libertarians are skeptical of attempts by their colleagues to "look for those additional factors [for grounding free will] in mysterious sources outside of the natural order or to postulate unusual forms of agency or causation."[13] If a libertarian version of free will *is* to be found in the natural order, though, then the Supervenience Argument must be avoided without the rejection of the Naturalistic Thesis.

What other options does the Naturalistic libertarian have? Premises (1) and (3) (of the Tricky argument) are supported by just those considerations used to invoke the first premise of the Consequence Argument. Rejecting either of these, then, licenses a rejection of the Consequence Argument. The same is true of the Transfer Principle. These two arguments, it seems, stand or fall together. Of course, the Naturalistic libertarian may not be motivated by the Consequence Argument in the first place, in which case she may reject them both and be done with it. In the absence of the Consequence Argument, however, it is not clear how she will be able to support her

position against compatibilists who insist that indeterminism is not a necessary component of free will.

Objections and Replies

Naturalistic libertarians who are motivated by the Consequence Argument are in something of a bind, for they must find a way to reject the Supervenience Argument that does not in turn license a rejection of the Consequence Argument. In this section, I will consider potential objections to the Supervenience Argument and, in each case, argue that either the objection fails or that, if it is successful, a parallel objection can be used against the Consequence Argument.

1. Suppose that the universe is such that, for every time, there is an earlier time at which someone performed a choosy action. Then a set of all choosy actions would not have a first element, but it clearly would not be empty.

This is correct, and it is the *only* way a non-empty, linearly-ordered class of choosy actions could fail to have a first element. The first thing to note is that this universe is not, it seems, *our* universe, and so we can view the Supervenience Argument as an argument to the effect that, if the Free Will Thesis is true in *our* universe, then our universe is not one in which Naturalism is true.

One might not think that this objection is very compelling on the grounds that the argument is supposed to show the *conceptual* incompatibility of Naturalism and the Free Will Thesis. This is too strong, though, for if the possibility of the sort of universe in question undermines the Supervenience Argument, it also undermines the Consequence Argument in exactly the same way. In a universe with an infinite backwards cascade of choosy actions, there is no time *t* such that a proposition expressing the state of affairs of that universe at *t* is one about which no one has or ever had a choice—i.e., there is no *P* such that N*P*. Thus, this objection faces a dilemma. Either the existence of (non-actual) Naturalistic universes with infinite backwards cascades of choosy actions does not pose a problem for the Supervenience Argument, or if it does, similar deterministic universes pose a problem for the Consequence Argument.

2. Your argument begins from the premise that some beliefs and desires (or their realizers) caused r *and proceeds from there. Actions, though,* are not *caused by beliefs and desires, in which case they do not nomically supervene on beliefs and desires (even in part), in which case you are not entitled to your supervenience premise.*

I mention this objection mainly for completeness. If the objection is just about what causes the action, we can easily replace beliefs and desires (or their realizers) with whatever one thinks *did* cause the action. If the objection is that actions are not *caused* at all, there is still no threat, for if the objection holds that the action does not even nomically supervene on some physical base, it will have rejected the very assumption the argument was designed to bring into tension with free will.

Since the action will supervene on the microphysical, we can (in the extreme case) replace *db*, *in*, and *e* with *rlc*, the contents of *r*'s reverse light cone. Then *r* supervenes nomically on *rlc* and the argument proceeds as before.

A last-ditch effort to save this objection might appeal to backwards causation, or, at least, backwards supervenience. That is, *r* might supervene on *future* microphysical events. Arguing in this manner puts the Consequence Argument at risk, though, for if *r* supervenes on future events, why not think that some event whose occurrence is recorded in *P* is one which supervenes on some future *act*? In this case, the future act could be one which, if it had not occurred, *P* would have been false, which would cast doubt on N*P* (and, hence, N(*P* & *L*)).

3. Pick some action, a*, which occurred before* r*. Then* a *is clearly something the agent* could have *done, since it is something the agent* did *do. The* x*s are* undetermined*, so* X *might have been false. Then* a *is an action that might have falsified* X*. Furthermore, the* in*s are undetermined, so* a *might have falsified them as well. Thus, you are not entitled to the first premise of the 'tricky' version of your argument, because there is an action,* a*, which the agent might have done and which might have falsified either of the two conjuncts of which that premise is a conjunction.*

There is an ambiguity in the expression 'event *e* falsified φ,' which will be dealt with in a later objection. I will set this aside here and simply suppose that it is correct to say that *a* is an action which our agent could have done (because our agent *did* do it) which might have falsified *x*. Does it follow that my defense of first premise of the 'tricky' argument, N(DB^+ & *IN* & *L* & *E* & *X*), is flawed?

No. My defense was that there is no action which one could perform that *might* falsify N(DB^+ & *IN* & *L* & *E*) and that *might* falsify N*X* and which, by virtue of this fact, *would* falsify N(DB^+ & *IN* & *L* & *E* & *X*). The fact that one could act in a way that *might* falsify φ and *might* falsify ψ is not sufficient, in the face of Nφ and Nψ, to demonstrate that this act *would* falsify N(φ & ψ). Suppose Herbert rolls a die; his die rolling might falsify 'the die does not land one' and 'the die does not land six,' but it is simply wrong to say it *would* falsify 'the die does not land one and the die does not land six.'

The defense of the tricky supervenience premise is more like this die-rolling case than McKay and Johnson's coin-tossing case. The easiest way to see this is by noting that our agent *did a*, but N(DB^+ & *IN* & *L* & *E* & *X*) *wasn't* falsified. Thus it simply cannot be right to say that if *a* had occurred, N(DB^+ & *IN* & *L* & *E* & *X*) would have been false. The objection has not located an action that undermines the premise.

4. Although a *does not undermine the tricky supervenience premise, there is an action which does. If* S *had not* r*-ed, something in the supervenience base would have been false. Since the first premise states, in essence, that*

nobody had a choice about anything in r*'s supervenience base, if* S *had not* r*-ed, that would have rendered* DB^+ *&* IN *&* L *&* E *&* X *false; thus,* S *had a choice about* DB^+ *&* IN *&* L *&* E *&* X.

As noted above, I do not wish to commit myself to the view that not-doings are actions, but I am happy to allow that they are for the sake of this objection. Besides, I have already argued that, even if they are not, if *S* had not *r*-ed then there would have been some other action, *r'*, that *S* would have performed instead.

There are a couple of things to note about this objection. It is true that, had *S* not *r*-ed, DB^+ & *IN* & *L* & *E* & *X* would have been false. In order for the objection to succeed, though, it must be true that *S could have* not *r*-ed. On the face of it, this sort of objection begs the question. I have offered an argument with the conclusion N*R*; the objection rejects on of the argument's premises *on the basis of* the claim of ~N*R*. On the other hand, some may insist that *I* beg the question if I do not allow my opponents this claim, for I then (they may say) unfairly shield my premises from any objections that do not presuppose my argument's conclusion. I do not wish to embroil myself in sticky issues about question begging and burdens of proof, so I will take another tack. I will allow my opponents that ~N*R* is true and examine what follows from it (if it is held consistently with the Consequence Argument).

So, suppose that ~N*R* *is* true. Then, goes the objection, N(DB^+ & *IN* & *L* & *E* & *X*) is false. Why is this? Because *S* is able to not-*r*, and *if S* had not *r*-ed, *r* would have rendered DB^+ & *IN* & *L* & *E* & *X* false.

Libertarians walk a thin line with this objection, though. It is part of the defense of the first premise of the Consequence Argument that people cannot now do anything that would, or even *might*, render false propositions entirely about the past.[14] Thus, libertarians cannot say that if *S* had not-*r*-ed, that would have rendered false any propositions entirely in the past of *r*—including DB^+ & *IN* & *L* & *E*. What is left? It must be the case that *S*'s not *r*-ing renders *X* false, which means this objection, if it is to work, must collapse into the next.

5. The premise N(DB^+ *&* IN *&* L *&* E *&* X*) is false because ~N*X *is true. Specifically,* S *could have not-*r*-ed and, if* S *had not* r*-ed, this not-*r*-ing would have rendered* X *false.*

Again, let us grant that *S* could have not *r*-ed. Then, it would seem, *S* could do something such that, if *S* had done it, it would ensure the falsity of *X*. That is, ~N*X* is true.

This, as I see it, would clearly invalidate the argument. If someone has, or ever had, a choice about the occurrence of the microphysical undetermined events upon which an action supervenes, then there is good reason to think that person has or had a choice about that action itself.

The problem is that this reply begins to look more like a *reductio* to the claim ~N*R*. The only way, it appears, to maintain the falsity of N*R* without jeopardizing the Consequence Argument is by postulating that we have the ability to falsify propositions about microphysical undetermined events.

This seems, on the face of it, every bit as implausible as the claim that we can falsify propositions about the past or the laws of nature. The fundamental idea behind the sort of 'objective indeterminism' that Naturalistic libertarians think is needed for free will is that *nothing else* determines these events. They just happen—full stop.

Can agent causal accounts get around this problem? They can if they are able to find a way to make agent causation consistent with Weak Naturalism. A few hurdles stand in the way: (for instance) if '*S*'s agent-causing of *e*' is itself an event, then it will have to either be a microphysical event or nomically supervene on a collection of them, either of which appears problematic for the agent causal account.

Even if agent causation *can* be made to square with the letter of Weak Naturalism, it is not clear it can ever be fully in the spirit of the naturalistic thesis. As already noted, the rhetorical purpose of the Supervenience Argument is, in large part, to raise the costs of accepting the Consequence Argument. Since determinism is not generally thought to be true, many people are willing to accept the Consequence Argument so long as they are able to get free will by simply appealing to the claims of our best physics (including quantum physics). However, if the Consequence Argument means free will comes only with the acceptance of 'spookier' elements of the world—whether they are events that do not nomically supervene on the microphysical or relations of immanent, agent causation—then Consequence-Argument-motivated libertarianism is left in a less appealing state than the one in which it was found.[15]

Notes

[1] Peter Van Inwagen, *An Essay on Free Will* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1983): 56.

[2] Van Inwagen 93. In this and following quotes, I have taken the liberty of replacing the propositional variables '*p*' and '*q*' with 'φ' and 'ψ' in order to avoid confusion later in the paper.

[3] Alicia Finch and Ted A. Warfield, "The *Mind* Argument and Libertarianism," *Mind* 107 (1998): 516.

[4] This discussion skips a lot of history. This version of the Consequence Argument is a derivative of van Inwagen's 'Third Argument' (van Inwagen, 93-95). The version of the transfer principle used in the Third Argument, called 'Beta,' has since been shown invalid (David Wideker, "On an Argument for Incompatibilism," *Analysis* 47 (1987): 37-41; 122 and Thomas McKay and David O. Johnson, "A Reconsideration of an Argument Against Compatibilism," *Philosophical Topics* 24 (1996): 113-122). See also Erik Carlson, "Incompatibilism and the Transfer of Power Necessity," *NOUS* 34 (2000): 227-290; Thomas M. Crisp and Ted A. Warfield, "The Irrelevance of Indeterministic Counterexamples to Principle Beta," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 61(1) (2000): 173-184; and Finch and Warfield, 520-521 for further discussions of these examples.) The transfer principle used here, which escapes those counterexamples, was first suggested by Wideker, and this rendition of the Consequence Argument has appeared in Finch and Warfield 522.

[5] Van Inwagen 96.

[6] McKay and Johnson 115.

[7] Finch and Warfield 523.

[8] Finch and Warfield 523-524; emphasis added.

[9] See, e.g., van Inwagen 142-143.

[10] This is different from the claim that there is nothing one *could have done* which might have falsified the past, which is in general false (since one might have falsified it back before it was the past) but in this case true by virtue of the fact that *r* is the first choosy act.

[11] See Timothy O'Connor, *Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will* (New York: Oxford UP, 2000) chap. 6 (I take it that the supervenience present in the Weak Naturalistic thesis is incompatible with O'Connor's emergentism) and Peter Unger, "Free Will and Scientiphicalism," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 65(1) (1983): 1-25. Van Inwagen considers—and endorses, if necessary—the rejection of something very much like Naturalism in order to preserve free will (213-217).

[12] See, e.g., Robert Kane, *The Significance of Free Will* (New York: Oxford UP, 1996), esp. chap. 8, and Laura Waddell Ekstrom, *Free Will: A Philosophical Study* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 2000) 81-129.

[13] Kane 115.

[14] Finch and Warfield 523.

[15] I am grateful to Tom Crisp, Zac Ernst, Al Mele, and Eddy Nahmias for helpful comments on various drafts of this paper.

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Bergman's *Persona* and the Mystery of Plot

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Introduction

Ingmar Bergman's *Persona* is a film that defies easy analysis and description. One becomes quickly disoriented in a labyrinth of flash backs, dream sequences, and personality confusion that characterize the action of the film. Such challenges make it difficult for viewers to construct a coherent, clear picture of what is at issue within this classic motion picture. Given this obscurity there has been a dizzying variety of interpretations with respect to the ultimate meaning of the film's content. It has been labeled variously as a psychological movie, a classic feminist picture, a reflexive view of filmmaking, or even as a commentary on the artistic process of creation. There are elements in the film that substantially support each of these interpretations.

However, some maintain that those seeking to discern a single, unified plot for *Persona* have gone awry. Their argument is that Bergman left the film purposely open to interpretation and that confining it to a solitary plot is tantamount to marginalizing its artistic value. Moreover, it has been suggested that the use of dictums based on meanings extrinsic to the film itself is arbitrary. At the very least, it seems that old standards of analyzing plots or narratives, such as those of Aristotle, are inapplicable to the film. Apparently, *Persona* transcends our ability to ground it in traditional formal analysis.

Or has it? Perhaps if we examine this film more closely we might identify the skeleton of a strong narrative structure. We may find that older ways of interpretation are still quite functional in spite of the postmodern feel of this beautifully artistic movie. Could it be that we have a standard for judging narratives, such as films, which resists changes of culture and the march of time?

It is the intent of this paper to defend such a view. *Persona*, like all film, is a narrative, although the clarity of the plot is deeply buried in the craftiness of the film's construction. In order to defend this assertion, we must first examine some elements that might give rise to confusion, such as the use of symbolic imagery and oddly juxtaposed temporal shifts in the movie's action.

This paper will demonstrate that this Twentieth Century work of narrative art is comparable to older forms, particularly that of classical mythology and drama. Finally, we'll see that this film submits itself to analysis in terms of archetypal form; the Monomyth of Joseph Campbell shall light the way for us in this regard.

Into the Labyrinth

Bergman's film is rife with symbolism. In fact, it is noteworthy that nearly every film image is purposely constructed to convey a symbolic meaning. This reflects the Swedish filmmaker's artistic craftiness. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the opening and closing montages.

As *Persona* begins, we are bombarded with a sequence of apparently disjointed and odd images; such as a cartoon vampire, a wrist being nailed to what is assumed to be a cross, a lengthy shot of a snow-covered mausoleum, and even a frame where the film appears to break down. Crucially, the audience is shown a brief scene involving a young boy. He appears to awaken from slumber and glance briefly at a book. Following that, he sees the faces of two women alternately fade into and out of focus on a screen. After a time, the faces appear to conjoin.

It turns out that these symbols directly relate to the upcoming action of the movie. As the film opens these images attune our awareness to forthcoming scenes. When a similar sequence of images is repeated at the film's closing our understanding of what has transpired is effectively reinforced. For example, the image of the boy peering at the hazy image of the women relates to the cold relationship between Elisabeth—one of the principal characters—and her unloved son. As the film unfolds, the audience becomes aware of the symbolic meaning of this shot. Moreover, the blurring and conjoining faces of the women, whom we later know as Sister Alma and Elisabeth, reflects the tension and identity confusion that takes place between them. It is in this relationship between the women that we should look for our plot. This is suggested by the image of the boy, who is *reading a book* prior to seeing their images.

The use of symbols not only helps us to comprehend particular themes in the film; they also aid us in discerning the complex plot. Given the obscurity of the action within the film we require this aid. The use of symbolic images in this way suggests that there *is* a story going on.

However, this is not the only level of symbolism operating in *Persona*. A deeper, more salient use of symbol is apparent in the vampire scene; one that relies on older archetypes to render it the desired meaning. In this scene Alma confronts Elisabeth concerning their strained relationship. Alma had peered deeply into her personal abyss, due largely to her association with Elisabeth. The silent actress used Alma as a character study, and exploited her naive willingness to share her intimate self, in order to further her art. In the process, Alma lost the simple presuppositions of her

constructed self and wrestled with her darker impulses. Thus, Elisabeth effectively drained the young nurse of her vitality.

Following the confrontation, when Alma wickedly rebukes Elisabeth for her cruelty, the young nurse inexplicably cuts her forearm with a fingernail. Subsequently, the actress puts her mouth to the wound, consuming the blood of the younger woman. After a moment Alma responds violently, repeatedly striking Elisabeth. This vampirism is symbolic on two levels. Primarily, it refers to the action of the film, thus operating as a plot clue. However, it also relies upon an ancient archetypal form, one which instantiates throughout literary, mythological, and religious tales. In this way it acts as a supporting symbol, one which refers to a theme extrinsic to the film itself.

Vampirism is a metaphorical representation of life, death and rebirth, which is founded on the archaic view of life as a cycle. Moreover, transference of essence from one party to another is characteristic of this pattern. Stories containing elements of this form go back at least as far as Hesiod's *Theogony*. The archetype of this symbol consists of three stages: *sporagmos* (a ritualized tearing asunder), *omophagia* (devouring of the torn), and rebirth. An example of this, summoned from ancient literature, is the castration of Uranus.

The tale of Uranus is told by Hesiod in the *Theogony*. Uranus, while making love to his wife, suffers castration (tearing asunder) by the hand of his son, Cronos. Subsequently, the severed phallus is cast into the sea (devoured). The essence of Uranus' member then gives birth to Aphrodite (rebirth).

How does Bergman's vampire incident fit this pattern? This scene involves each element of the archetypal pattern. Alma cuts her arm (the tearing asunder), followed by Elisabeth devouring her essence (*omophagia*). After the transfer of precious blood, Alma reacts violently, as if her rejection of Elizabeth actualizes her own rebirth. Alma emerges from the vampirism of the actress and shortly returns to her life.

Persona admits of comparison to ancient forms in this way. Our recognition of a symbolic archetype invites us to delve deeper in search of similarities. There are other ways in which this film relates to classic literature and drama. For example, there is reflexive activity within *Persona* that calls attention to the fact that the film comments on filmmaking. As I noted earlier, the movie is framed by symbolic sequences, much the same way a movie takes place within a certain frame. Moreover, there is a shot of the director and a cameraman in the act of filming contained in the movie. These, among other images, suggest reflexivity. Paul Newell Campbell explicates this point nicely in his article, "*The Reflexive Function of Bergman's Persona*". This directly relates to a theatrical technique employed by ancient playwrights, called *metadrama.* Like Bergman, the classic artists of ancient Greece often included in their plays an aside; the characters would comment on the action of the narrative as drama. There is a parallel here.

But what about subject matter? If we are drawing comparisons to ancient literature, surely we must say something about the themes contained within the narrative itself. It is a function of narratives, both dramatic and literary, to comment on the nature of human life. In the film, the existentialist themes of Sartre are unmistakable. The dialogue attributed to the characters is rich with language regarding the absurdity of life, despair at nothingness, and other existentialist notions contemporary to the film. One aspect of Bergman's work is that the principal characters realize their inauthenticity and attempt to withdraw from being-for-others.

In this regard it is similar to other narrative forms, including classical myth and drama. Both deal largely with matters of morality and the nature of human life. Of course, Greek literature presents a portrait of the human condition that is drastically different than that of a 20th century existentialist, but thematically, the idea is similar. One cue that may lead to this comparison is that Elizabeth suffers her breakdown on stage while portraying Electra!

However, despite our recognition of parallels to other narrative forms, we've done little to answer specific ambiguities that rise in the actual experience of *Persona*. Often, the scenes presented to the audience are of questionable reality. One is at times uncertain whether one is watching a dream sequence or actual interaction between characters. This confusion is particularly evident in the scenes taking place at the seaside cottage. Moreover, the temporal feeling of the movie is similarly disorderly; Susan Sontag notes that parts of the film seem realistically chronological, while others seem to have been washed of their temporal character. Bergman uses a technique of doubling, or repeating scenes, to establish this atemporal effect. It appears that traditional plot evaluations can't hold where there is a lack of linear progression. This is to say that narrative forms rely on a conception of time that relates events in a specific succession. If they do not proceed in this fashion they lose their efficacy. However, film by nature requires a level of this progression, in so far as it involves the audiences' awareness of transpiring events. In this way, *Persona* is no different.

The important thing to note is a presupposed necessity within this notion of time. We are meant to think that a plot can only operate when it moves in a clearly linear way between isolated events—scenes, in the case of film—connecting them all in a necessary order. It must be granted that this is often true; we can recognize this form in many films and literary works. But this need not be the case.

For example, we can eliminate the necessity of linear progression on a scene-by-scene basis if we position the characters and their respective transformations as the legitimate events of succession. *Persona* is a deeply psychological movie; it makes perfect sense to track the action of the film in terms of apparent mental states and personality changes in the characters. By following the development of the characters themselves we are freed from the necessity of justifying the location of scenes in relation to one another. Rather, we need only relate the continuous transformations of

the principal parties. As such, our notion of plot progression is one that reflects a process of evolution rather than mere linear sequence. Thereby, we salvage the possibility of a plot.

How do we follow the progress of the respective characters through a maelstrom of images and confusing ontological shifts? We may do so again by drawing comparison to an archetypal form, which was elucidated by the great classicist and mythology scholar, Joseph Campbell.

In his seminal work, *The Hero With a Thousand Faces*, Campbell painstakingly elaborates a symbolic equivalence between principal characters and thematic developments of stories that appears universal. In so doing, he reduced the developmental aspect of characters, heroes, into a form of journey. As a result, he derived a form by which we can understand character narratives.

According to Campbell, the hero's journey is constituted by three fundamental components, which may manifest in various forms in a given tale. First, the heroes experience a *call to adventure,* to which they must surrender the everydayness of their lived world, and embark into the unknown. In the second stage, that of *initiation and trial,* they are transformed and forged into who they are to become. Finally, the heroes must *return* to the original lived world, bringing back to their mundane experience the transformed element.

If it can be demonstrated that the characters of *Persona* follow such a pattern, then our cause is significantly furthered. Let us now examine where and how, in the unfolding of *Persona*, we can identify Campbell's ideas.

The *call to adventure* is easily identified and related to Alma and Elisabeth. For the former, it is simply the charge given to her by the psychiatrist. Alma is called upon by her superior to work with Elisabeth, a mentally tough woman who chooses to remain silent, but exhibits no other signs of mental instability. The young nurse realizes that she may not have the fortitude for the undertaking and subsequently voices her concerns. Nevertheless, she answers the call and embarks on the road of trials. Elisabeth, on the other hand, experiences her call to adventure in a way that is more veiled. Her challenge rises on stage, when she realizes the duplicity of role-playing. Upon apprehending that the world of her construction is false she seeks to withdraw from it. This is her calling to the transformative path.

The *initiation/road of trials* that Elisabeth treads consists of maintaining her silence and seeking to abandon the pretenses and lies of her previous life. She confronts the horrors of existence, represented by the images of the burning monk and the photograph of a child in the concentration camp. Her expressions of recoil illustrate this point. Moreover, Elisabeth is forced to consider her poisonous relationship with her husband and son. However, learning to accept and even embrace her own cruelty, Elisabeth becomes herself a trial for the young Alma.

Alma, on the other hand, is lured by the seductive silence of Elisabeth into uncovering her own inauthentic life. Alma is forced to peer deeply into the abyssal darkness that lies within her as well. In spite of her desperate clinging to the familiar and acceptable—her roles as good fiancé,

nurse, etc.—Alma examines her own duplicity and inconsistencies. Her investigation of her sexuality is a case in point. Early on, she tells Elisabeth that she would never be unfaithful to her fiancé. Shortly after, she admits that she had; having already participated in an orgy with strangers. Thus, as she opens to Elisabeth, Alma examines herself, but with increasing revulsion as her false persona slips away.

At length, the road of trials reaches a climax when Alma confronts Elisabeth in the vampire scene. The true dynamic of the relationship reveals itself, and the exploration and initiation ceases. Alma and Elisabeth part company, although to different ends.

Thus begins the *return* stage of the journey. Following the confrontation, Elisabeth hastily departs the seaside cottage. Our last image of her is a flash of her face; she wears the make-up of her costume as Elektra. The actress has returned to her familiar world. However, her expression is one of shock or dread. Elisabeth has returned to her roles, but her face betrays her transformative experience.

Sister Alma also quickly returns to her mundane world. After Elisabeth's departure, Alma puts the cottage in order, dons her uniform, and boards a bus that will take her back to normal life. The viewer is aware, however, that the young nurse returns with new insight. Another visual clue is helpful here; Alma stops to look in a mirror as she prepares to leave the cottage. As the young nurse gazes into the glass an image of Elisabeth appears behind her. This hints that Alma is reflecting on her own experience. Both characters, then, have made their return.

Thus, we see that the characters of *Persona* follow this narrative pattern. At bottom the motion picture is a character story regarding the development of two women and their confrontations; both with their deeper selves, and with each other. An interesting side note highlights this process. Bergman changes the settings wherein the action takes place according to the stages in which the characters evolve. The movie begins in the hospital, while the transformative *road of trials* unfolds at the beach house. The final images of the respective women, one boarding a bus and the other on stage, demonstrate the *return*. I believe that such movement is intentional, and corresponds purposefully to the transformation of the principal parties.

Conclusion

So it seems that we have grounds upon which to evaluate the merit of *Persona* as a story. When we draw comparisons to other narrative forms, even those of ancient culture, we find similarities. Moreover, we've seen that the sequential nature of a story need not be linear. Most importantly, it can be shown that *Persona* corresponds to narrative form along lines of character development, like the heroic journey of Joseph Campbell. I do not believe that such similarities are meaningless. Reducing *Persona* to fit a narrative structure shouldn't limit one's enjoyment of the film

as a work of art. Clearly, there are other levels to the cinematic experience that can, and should, be enjoyed for their own sake. It simply means that we are able evaluate it in terms of its complex and involved plot.

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Book Symposium

Margaret McLaren. *Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity* (SUNY Press, 2002)

Author's Opening Remarks

Margaret McLaren, *Rollins College*

First, I want to say thank you for inviting me to do this symposium. My book, *Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity* was published in October 2002. My opening remarks will summarize some of its main themes but, of course, I cannot cover everything I discuss in the book. I tried to make the book both accessible to an interdisciplinary audience, and interesting to specialists in the field.

In my book, I aim to do at least three things. I argue that Foucault's work ought to be examined as a whole with equal attention given to his later works as to his early and middle works, which is something that is not often done. I examine feminist criticisms of Foucault that claim that his work is not useful to feminists; this has larger implications because by extension I am also rejecting claims that postmodernism is antithetical to politics. And finally, by exploring what Foucault says about subjectivity in relation to feminist practices, I offer the beginnings of a new theory of subjectivity that is both embodied and political, based in part on Foucault's ideas.

In the first chapter, I offer a brief overview of the debate among feminists with regard to the usefulness of Foucault's work. Although some feminists say Foucault is dangerous and undermines the possibilities for a liberatory politics, I argue that Foucault offers useful resources for feminism, including the idea of immanent and situated social criticism as well as the notion of a subject that is embodied, that is subject to social influences but is not determined by them. This chapter also provides background both on Foucault and on feminism.

In the second chapter, I take up the issue of social criticism without norms. Many social and political theorists argue that norms such as equality, rights, justice, and freedom are necessary for social and political critique of current social injustice and inequality. I demonstrate that Foucault engages in a situated or immanent social criticism in his genealogical work. This situated social criticism relies on implicit normative notions such as freedom. Such notions are not simply appropriated from liberal political theory that he criticized in much of his work; they are explicitly reconceptualized in his later works. Foucault draws on ancient philosophy and on Kant for his

reconstructions of freedom and critique. I conclude by showing how situated social criticism aimed at anti-domination can be useful to feminists. This idea of situated social criticism is found in other philosophical traditions such as pragmatism, critical social theory, and feminism. I try to show that Foucault is employing the same sort of social criticism.

The third chapter examines what Foucault says about subjectivity. This is especially important because Foucault claims that examining subjectivity has been an essential motif in his work:

> My objective . . . has been to create a history of the different modes by which in our culture human beings are made subjects. My work has dealt with three modes of objectification that transform human beings into subjects. Thus it is not power but the subject, which is the general theme of my research.[1]

In his early works, such as *The Order of Things* and *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault seemed to suggest that the concept of man was problematic. For instance he claims "man is disappearing."[2] This is the point on which many people criticize Foucault—the notion of the decentered, fragmented subject. On the other hand, in genealogies like *Discipline and Punish* and *History of Sexuality, Volume I*, subjectivity is constituted through disciplines and practices. Perhaps understandably, feminist critics have taken issue with each of these rather extreme positions. Feminists argue that Foucault's rejection of subjectivity in his early works does little to help women who had yet to achieve the right to equality and moral and political agency conferred upon subjects. Conversely, feminists who focus on Foucault's middle works claim that he presented a picture of the subject wholly determined by outside social forces. I counter the first criticism by showing that Foucault's early work is a criticism and rejection of post-enlightenment subjectivity. He is talking specifically about Descartes and Sartre, so he is criticizing notions of subjectivity in other philosophical works and not rejecting the concept of subjectivity altogether. To counter the second criticism, I draw on Foucault's later work in which he articulates a self that is active rather than passively determined by outside forces. Retaining the notion that subjects are socially, culturally and historically situated, I then turn to Foucault's conception of the body in chapter 4.

Many feminists have successfully drawn upon Foucault's idea of the body as shaped by social norms, disciplines and practices. For example, Sandra Bartky, in her article "Foucault, Feminism, and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power," explores the disciplines and practices that shape the feminine body.[3] The feminine disciplines she discusses include make-up, exercise and bodily comportment. Susan Bordo applies Foucault's ideas to the widespread contemporary phenomenon of eating disorders, noting their prevalence among young women and linking them to social norms of slenderness.[4] Both Bartky and Bordo draw on Foucault's work to illustrate

graphically how the feminine body is constructed through social norms and practices. However, they find limitations to Foucault's notion of the body, questioning whether or not it is possible to escape the insidious power of these disciplinary practices. I contend that although one never steps outside the social altogether, resistance to particular social norms and practices is not only permissible in Foucault's view, it is essential.

In chapter 5, I take up issues of identity. In feminist theory, there is some debate about issues of identity and the category of women. Many feminists say that the category of "woman" is necessary to ground and mobilize a feminist politics. On the other hand, challenges have come from working class women, women of color, and lesbians claiming that a singular or unified category of women obscures the differential social locations that women in non-dominant groups occupy and fails to do justice to the variety of their lived experiences. Foucault would side with the second group of feminists. He was deeply suspicious of identity categories and their tendency to homogenize. Keeping both sets of feminist concerns in mind, I show how Foucault's suspicions are realized with regard to sex categories such as bisexuality and intersexuality. Rigid sex categories simply exacerbate the problems of recognition and justice for these groups. I propose that rallying against sex-gender oppression, including the oppression of rigid gender categories, will be more productive in achieving feminist goals such as the aim of having an inclusive social movement.

I turn in chapter 6 to Foucault's later work. In Volumes 2 and 3 of *History of Sexuality* and in several essays, Foucault's work takes an ethical turn. He is explicitly concerned with notions such as freedom and critique. Drawing upon early Greek and Roman philosophy, he focuses on practices of the self. Practices of the self are operations performed by the individual herself on the body, soul, conduct, and thoughts and way of being to achieve an end such as happiness or wisdom. These practices serve to shape the ethical self because they involve specific ways of behaving toward others and mastering one's own desires. Foucault draws heavily on ancient philosophy to articulate this notion of practices of the self. I look at two practices–self-writing and truth telling–and apply them to the contemporary feminist practices of autobiography and consciousness-raising in the last chapter.

In the conclusion, I suggest that new ideas of self and identity may serve feminist purposes well for social transformation.

Notes

[1] Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," Afterword in *Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, eds. Hubert L. Dreyfuss and Paul Rabinow (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1982): 208-209.

[2] Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971): 385.

[3] Sandra Lee Bartky, *Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression* (New York: Routledge, 1990).

[4] Susan Bordo, *Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture and the Body* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1993).

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Book Symposium

Margaret McLaren. *Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity* (SUNY Press, 2002)

Relativism and Particularity: A Commentary on McLaren's *Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity*.

Suzanne Jaeger, *University of Central Florida*

Margaret McLaren's book, *Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity,* provides a well written, informative, and challenging analysis of some intersections between Foucault and feminism. McLaren provides a comprehensive overview of Foucault's work, as well as a very useful taxonomy of various feminisms and feminist projects. If you are interested either in Foucault or in the social and political concerns of feminist philosophies, I highly recommend that you put her book on your reading list.

McLaren derives four core feminist commitments from a variety of sources and then uses them as criteria according to which Foucault's work can be measured as useful to feminists. First, Foucault's ideas must be able to serve as a resource for political and social change to end the subordination of women. Second, his work needs to address the relationship between theory and practice. Third, it must be relevant to experience, and fourth, it must be accessible. At the end of her analysis McLaren supports the contributions Foucault makes to feminism, contending that "Foucault provides a notion of the subject that is useful to feminists, and that his account of social norms provides an important link between individual experience and social change."[1]

The comments that I would like to offer for critical discussion are connected to Foucault's account of social norms. Although I agree with McLaren's reading of the value and importance of Foucault's work for feminists, especially his later work on the care of the self, I am not as tolerant as she with the "tensions" in his work. I have two main critical points to discuss. The first concerns residual monolithic assumptions in Foucault's analysis of social norms. The second is drawn from Kelly Oliver's concerns about the inherent violence and aggression that is promoted by Foucault as a necessary aspect of a thriving self's relations with others. For Foucault, the affirmation of the self is defined in its resistance to normativity, that is to say, in a struggle against the self's bonds with others in a socially meaningful world.[2] I would like to suggest that there are alternative ways of conceiving self-affirmation consistent with Foucault's account of subjectivity as socially conditioned.

With regard to my first point, Foucault makes an important argument for the immanence of subjectivity, or what he also calls interiority. The very way in which we think and understand ourselves, our relations to others, our linguistically articulated knowledge of others, and of the world are all features and conditions of consciousness that arise, according to Foucault, as effects of specific social and historical forces. Subjectivity is inflected by hierarchal structures of symbolic power and socially conditioned bodily powers. Quoting Edward Said, Foucault "showed, in effect, that the existence of systems of thinking and perceiving transcend the powers of individual subjects, individual humans who were inside those systems . . . , and hence the individual *cogito* was displaced, or demoted, to the status of illusory autonomy or fiction."[3] If, however, Foucault is right, and his is an accurate description of the material conditions of human self-consciousness, it must also be true of Foucault's consciousness. Although his descriptions of the history of sexuality and of the invention of the subject's desire as an effect of prohibition, and his other genealogies are all informative, interesting and compelling, they are also relative to his perspective. There are other points of view, other ways of understanding the history of sexuality. There can be no closure on the histories to be told that provide compelling reasons why we have certain forms of life today. Foucault, however, does not always acknowledge the relative status of his own claims. His discussions of non-normalizing normativity, for example, give his monolithic viewpoint away.

Following Foucault, McLaren asserts that one important feminist project is to resist norms, particularly those norms that oppress women. The first task, however, is to recognize the norms, and the difficulty here is who gets to say what norms are operating in any particular situation. Furthermore, what criteria will determine the analysis? How do we know when the analysis has correctly identified the norms functioning in a particular situation? Is it possible for a Foucauldian analysis to be mistaken about the norms it identifies? If there is no universally objective, bird's eye view of situations, if participants in social practices only understand their situations from the limited perspectives of their socially situated consciousnesses, then there can be no one "true" description of the norms operating in any situation. The various participants may not even agree about the norms that frame the situation as a particular kind of practice. Some examples mentioned in McLaren's book will help to make my point more concrete.

There are debates in the history of feminism about the oppressive conditions in which women are homemakers and housewives. Not all women, however, experience these roles as oppressive. There are similar discussions of S & M practices, prostitution and strip-club dancing. Not all women experience these practices as disempowering. There are no clear ways to determine the effects of power that play out in these situations. As a critical theorist, it is important to ask whether one considers third person reports of power dynamics to be more reliable than first person reports. What are the reasons for privileging the perspectives of the cultural critic, anthropologist or genealogist? For what reasons might we want to privilege the participant's first-person perspective,

the self-understanding, for example, of a strip-club dancer or prostitute? The cultural critic needs to be careful here not to naturalize the norms that she sees defining particular practices.

To be fair, Dr. McLaren states that there is a tension in Foucault's work when he discusses normativity and non-normalizing disciplinary practices.[4] On the one hand, Foucault is suspicious of norms insofar as they oppressively normalize behavior. He also acknowledges, however, that not all social norms or all disciplinary practices normalize in the same way. Foucault is opposed to philosophical norms that are universal and ahistorical. Social norms, on the other hand, are cultural phenomena that prescribe behavior. "His objection to norms that impose universal principles does not indict social norms embedded in specific historical and cultural practices that are constitutive of social interaction."[5] McLaren then goes on to discuss the self-affirming, non-normalizing disciplinary practices that Foucault finds in the ancient Greeks.

It is precisely at this point that McLaren needs to say more about Foucault's authority to identify these norms functioning in a culture's practices other than his own. Why is Foucault in a privileged position to assess the norms of ancient Greek society? Is his understanding of these norms also historically conditioned? Surely Foucault's particular scholarly interests are also social-embedded and theoretically invested. Foucault's interpretation of the meanings and norms of Ancient Greek culture are given, however, in the same monolithic and objectivist tones as other historians and anthropologists, and for this reason the tensions in his work are problematic.

Why not be fully committed to a perspectival view of consciousness? Why not admit that one's own claims are shaped by the material, social and historical forces that give rise to them as truths about the world, and of others? It might mean acknowledging the socially granted privilege of having a voice, of being dominant, of using effectively the various tools of rational persuasion including the discovery of evidence. My point here is not to disagree with the relativistic implications of Foucault's explanation of subjectivity. My concern is with Foucault's inconsistency. If one accepts that human self-consciousness is an effect of material, social and historical forces, then any and all claims that we make, including our descriptions of the norms that we believe structure our lives or the lives of others, are relative to our limited perspectives. I do not believe that Foucault acknowledges enough the relative status of his genealogies. And the omission is troubling.

I want to turn now to my second point, to suggest that violence and aggression are not always the best attitudes to cultivate in relation to the norms that structure our lives with others in the various social worlds that we inhabit. There are features of Foucault's philosophy that are a little scary. McLaren acknowledges, for example, that Foucault views social relations as strategic and agonistic, and that he "suggests that we should analyze power relations in terms of struggle, conflict, or war."[6] Although I agree that there are situations that call for combative strategies of resistance against dominant and domineering social norms, there may be reasons to take up other attitudes, such as compassion, sympathy, and love. These attitudes are not necessarily weak modes of self-care,

or self-knowledge.

All social relations involve normative structures. Our bonds with others in the various communities in which we are participants unavoidably entail values, some of which we may find restrictive and oppressive. I want to suggest, nevertheless, that the gesture of resisting norms can be self-destructively anti-social.

There is a concept that has some currency in improvisational theater that is helpful when trying to understand the self-destructive aspects of Foucauldian strategies of resistance. It is the concept of blocking. An actor in an improvised scene begins by offering some line or action in response to which another actor is expected to develop the scene. To block is to reject the offering. It closes the scene down and quickly becomes frustrating. Here is a very simple example taken from Keith Johnstone's book called *Impro: Improvisation and the Theatre*:

'Hello, how are you.'

'Oh, same as usual. Nice day isn't it.'

'Oh, I don't think so.'[7]

Here is another example: an actor mimes wiping a table and clearing away cups and saucers. A second actor walks in and says, "Did you find a large black purse under this table?" The first actor replies, "this isn't a table."

In both these scenes one of the improvisers says "NO." Their response is a form of aggression that blocks the development of action. Blocking occurs in improvisational theater when actors get scared, or embarrassed, or when they are worried about being original. The contrast with blocking is accepting. Here is an example of accepting from Johnstone's book:

'Sit down, Smith.'

'Thank you, Sir.'

'It's about the wife, Smith.'

'She told you about it has she, Sir?'

'Yes, yes, she's made a clean breast of it.'[8]

Johnstone tells us that neither actor in this improvised scene is quite sure what the scene is about but he's willing to play along to see what emerges.[9] Accepting involves saying 'yes' to the norms, values, concepts, ideas that constitute a scene as a recognizable scene. To block a scene is to stymie the flow of creativity. I am suggesting here that to maintain a constant state of resistance with all social norms similarly blocks the development of one's own and other's creative powers to be in a situation. To retool subjectivity within the conditions of human social existence requires some acceptance of social situations and the complexities of power dynamics. In other words, resistance isn't always the best answer.

In her book, *Witnessing: Beyond Recognition*, Kelly Oliver rejects the violence inherent in Foucault's appeal to strategies of resistance on the basis of an understanding of social space

provided by the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. She also considers what bell hooks and others have to say about love, even the hard case of loving one's oppressors. Oliver sees the need to develop other strategies besides aggressive resistance if we are to promote social change. She questions the ontology of subjectivity wherein violence is conceived as the underlying force of self-assertion in social interaction.

In closing, I would like to suggest a reason why I believe that Oliver is on the right track and why the affirmation of love also works as a strategy of self-affirmation. I draw my account from the work of Merleau-Ponty. It relies on the existential fact that we are perceptually open to our lived worlds of experience. According to Merleau-Ponty, the norms that structure human experience arise not just because we share ideas and symbolic expressions, but also as a result of our bodily modalities of being in the world. When we communicate with another, we are responding and exchanging information using a number of different perceptual capacities. Our more bodily responses are often unconscious, not in the Freudian sense, but in a pre-reflective way. That is to say, the nature of human consciousness is such that it is structured by habitual patterns of perception. The term "perception" is understood here to refer not just to vision, but also to auditory and tactile sensations, our ability to taste and smell, our powers of mobility, our affects and emotions, all of which connect us to the world in specific ways. Our perceptual powers are both socially conditioned and dependent upon natural, species-specific bodily capacities that are endowed to particular human beings in unique ways. The habitual patterns of perception are the structures of experience that make possible knowledge of things in the world. They also bind us to those in our linguistic communities who have similar ways of knowing and understanding the world. However, because perception is not only structured by what is meaningful at an abstract, symbolic level, but also through our bodily ways of being in an environment and with others, therefore, new possibilities for knowledge arise as transformations in our habitual ways of perceiving. The ever-changing environments in which we live force us to renegotiate our familiar ways of interacting.

We may, of course, remain closed to new possibilities. In this case, we bring to bear on our lived situations the habits of thought and action that are most familiar. We rely on structures of perceptual knowledge that anticipate only certain kinds of results. Some features of the situation, and of others in the situation will, therefore, remain invisible to us. There are numerous reasons why we engage with others in this way. For example, such is the basis of professional training. We learn to engage with the world and with others through structures of experience acquired as the discipline of a practice. In some disciplines, like teaching, to deviate too much from established, institutionally recognized standards and modes of perception leaves one vulnerable to charges of eccentricity, or worse, liability. On the personal level, we may remain relatively fixed in our perceptions because of limitations in the time we have to spend with others, the roles we play in each other's lives, personality differences with respect to risk-taking, and the need to establish

comfortable personal boundaries. If our perceptions of others become too rigidly fixed it can be a sign of neurosis, or feelings of fear and uncertainty about the unknown. Intelligence, level of education and our particular perceptual abilities are also important factors contributing to our ability to be open to new ways of understanding others and the world.

What I am suggesting here is that social structures change by virtue of our interactions with others and with their differences. Violence and resistance are ways of forcing rupture in the familiar structures of institutional practices, but there are other possibilities by virtue of the fact that meaning in human existence is not just a result of repetitions of habituated structures of perception. It is sometimes unavoidably necessary to renegotiate our familiar ways of being in the world precisely because our perceptions are only partial, limited by our perspective and by the temporal nature of our existence. When we remember these humble conditions for our forms of knowledge, it should also remind us of the possibilities for new knowledge, for something new to happen, and for the differences evident when we listen to other people's perspectives. It is for this reason that I believe that subjects are not re-iterated in identical ways through the effects of power or discourse. No one theorist has the singular authority to identify the norms that structure our social spaces.

Notes

[1] Margaret McLaren, *Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity* (New York: SUNY Press, 2002): 17.

[2] See Kelly Oliver, *Witnessing: Beyond Recognition* (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2001).

[3] Edward W. Said, *Humanism and Democratic Criticism* (New York: Columbia UP, 2004): 9.

[4] McLaren 68.

[5] McLaren 68.

[6] McLaren 78. See Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures" in *Power/Knowledge*, tr. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, Kate Soper (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972): 78 - 108.

[7] Keith Johnstone, *Impro: Improvisation and the Theatre* (New York: Theatre Arts Books, 1984): 94

[8] Johnstone 95.

[9] Johnstone 95.

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Book Symposium

Margaret McLaren. *Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity* (SUNY Press, 2002)

Foucault, Feminism, and the Care of the Self: Lessons from Antiquity

Joanne Waugh, *University of South Florida*

In *Feminism, Foucault, and Subjectivity*, Margaret McLaren accomplishes her aims. She shows how "Foucault's ideas about body, power, and subjectivity can provide important theoretical resources for feminism"—here and now at beginning of the 21st century. The most important of these resources is his conception of subjectivity as embodied and historically constituted. McLaren also addresses feminist critiques of these ideas, showing how useful the ideas that accompany his notion of subjectivity, viz., social criticism and political practices, can be for feminist theory. She does this by reading his later work in relation to what has been termed his "genealogical work," seeing the former not as a departure but as a continuation of the latter, "as a continuation of his earlier project to think through a new conception of subjectivity that is embodied and manifests itself through practices. These practices both enable and constrain, but freedom is conceptualized and situated within material, institutional and disciplinary matrices."[1] Finally, she demonstrates how "his ideas and practices of the self can be applied to contemporary feminist practices."[2]

Inasmuch as I agree with McLaren and applaud her project, attempting to find some major point on which I can criticize her seems a rather artificial, forced, and consequently, pointless exercise. I propose instead to contribute (or try to contribute, at any rate) to this project—perhaps even extend it—in the areas in which I can make a contribution. I begin by examining why the book is necessary and useful in feminist theory as articulated by English language feminists. In the process, I hope to show that much of their criticisms of Foucault result from mistaken notions of language and meaning, both as speech and texts, notions that underlie liberal feminism as well as the epistemological and ethical projects inspired by the Enlightenment. Finally, I will argue that Foucault's return to the ideas of Classical Antiquity in his later work proves to be corrective of these Enlightenment concepts, and as such is not only essential for "his project to think through a new conception of subjectivity that is embodied and manifests itself through practice" but is also valuable for the project(s) of contemporary feminist philosophy.

Despite the number of books in English devoted to Foucault, it seems that for common sense Anglo-American philosophers there is still a need for accounts of his work in clear, no-nonsense, straightforward English. It seems that French poststructuralist philosophy, for which the sobriquet Foudada was coined, continues to elude their grasp as does German hermeneutic philosophy and critical theory, known as "Gadamermas," though the latter is more accessible than the former. McLaren presents Foucault's thought in clear, straightforward prose, taking care to tell her audience what she will say, saying it, and then telling them what she said. Philosophers in the Continental European tradition, as well as more literary-minded philosophers in the English-language tradition, might object to this no-nonsense style, for Foucault, Derrida and other poststructuralists believe that the way they write is conducive to, if not necessary for understanding the points they are trying to make. But there is no question that for common sense Anglo-American philosophers, McLaren's style is a virtue, for they need or want a translation of poststructuralist thought into terms they can understand. That this very need or desire may prove an obstacle to the understanding they seek is not an observation that their view of philosophy and philosophical writing easily permits. That McLaren can provide such a translation is a testament to her command of both the Continental European and Anglo-American philosophical traditions. That she must do I take as indicating that the view of speech and texts still dominant among English language philosophers is problematic. It is this problematic view of speech and texts that Foucault is trying to combat, as indeed are Derrida, Kristeva, and Irigary, though by different means and by different discourses. Derrida had made the point that written language, and not speech, has been the model for dominant conceptions of language in the Western tradition, despite the fact that philosophical writing has disguised the fact that it is a form of writing. Notoriously, Derrida does this in "Plato's Pharmacy," where he cites Socrates' remarks about writing as evidence of philosophy's appearing to privilege speech over texts.

I believe that Derrida and others who have interpreted Socrates' remarks as applying to writing regardless of historical context are incorrect to do so. If we read Plato in historical context, a context he takes great pains to present, it is far more likely that the remarks are directed to the *technai* of the Sophists. Of course, these remarks also betray some of Plato's reasons for writing philosophical dialogues. But the point about philosophical writing is well taken, and applies, I suggest, to how philosophers explain language itself: as a system in which certain variations shown among the structural properties of certain objects or things (utterances, texts) generate meaning according to rules and conventions. For the purposes of studying how language can convey meaning, then, utterances and texts are interchangeable; thus it matters not which is the focus of our attention. But speech and texts are not interchangeable, as I hope to show.

As anyone who has studied archaic and classical Greece in any detail can tell you, in the absence of a writing system sufficiently simple, unambiguous and exhaustive in representing speech,

the Greeks for centuries relied on speech—oral public exchanges—for the preservation and transmission of culturally significant communication. Religion and ritual, ethics and etiquette, law and customs—what Foucault would call "discourses" and English language philosophers, social norms or laws—were produced and maintained through bodily public performances. In these performances meaning was conveyed not just by what speakers said, but on how they looked in saying it: the stances of their bodies, the expressions of their faces, and the tone of their voices, and their movements and gestures, or lack thereof. Before laws were inscribed in clay or stone or leather or papyrus, before power was conceived of as primarily juridical and prohibitive, power in the form of social norms was produced, preserved, and communicated through the speech and acts and performances of bodies. We may speak of cultural inscription, of "discourses written on the body" as Foucault says, but this is misleading, for the body is not a metaphor for the text, the text is a metaphor for how the ability to communicate is in the body. The body communicates not just through speech but through movement and touch; this is the point that Kristeva and Irigaray are so intent on making. And the knowledge that is stored in the body is more stable and much more difficult to cast off than that articulated in language and inscribed in enduring substances. Texts are poor substitutes for bodies until or unless embodied, if only in imagination by readers. Once they are embodied we know whether the speech act recorded by the text is ironical, triumphant or apologetic. (Think of the once ubiquitous, "Yeah, right.") We know whether the parties involved in communicative acts are male or female, rich or poor, Gentile or Jew, Hebrew or Muslim, European or non-European, colonizer or colonized, Protestant or Catholic, heterosexual or homosexual, or otherwise culturally endowed. For the text does not mean just because the author intends that it should; it requires a reader. Nor does the author have control over who will read it and how it will be read; one need think only of the many conflicting interpretations of the works of Plato or Nietzsche or Foucault or Kristeva or Irigaray.

It should come as no surprise that Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger, Barthes, Kristeva, Derrida, Foucault, and Irigaray have been inspired by Classical Antiquity in contesting the Enlightenment notion of the disembodied Modern subject of Enlightenment discourse, the autonomous agent whose body may be subject to domination but whose consciousness is free. The ideas of Classical Antiquity are especially useful for French feminists, poststructuralists and postmodernists, or anyone else wanting to dispute the claim that consciousness is identical with the subject but its body is something other than the subject. There is, as Foucault recognized, no theory of the subject in Greek philosophy and hence no subject. For the ancients, the self is embodied; it is social and political but nonetheless personal. The Modern distinction between public and private does not obtain, for we are by nature, as Aristotle reminds us, animals of the *polis*. This means that freedom does not consist in the unconstrained will of the Enlightenment individual; the primary meaning of freedom in classical Greece is not being owned—literally, being autonomous. Greek *autonomeia* is not

Kantian autonomy; the self that rules the self is embodied and political, for it gets its identity from the *polis*, the household, and its family. Neither the self nor the body is a text, and a text is not a model of language. For the Greeks, there was not language, but *logos*, speech, and before *logos* there was *muthos*, publicly performed poetry. *Muthos* belongs simultaneously to no one and to everyone; it is authorless poetry, speech that is "always already" cultural discourse for it does not exist apart from embodied performances that produce, preserve, and communicate it.

McLaren's search for a better metaphor than cultural inscription in explaining how embodied selves are culturally endowed is in keeping with the insight that the very notion of a body is already part of a cultural discourse. Her candidate, internalization, is an improvement over inscription, emphasizing as it does that cultural discourse is public discourse that assigns identity to embodied individuals. There is no body that does not possess a cultural identity, and no unsexed, genderless mind that deserves rights whatever its sexed and gendered body, the goals of liberal feminism, notwithstanding. But neither do such embodied selves commit one to linguistic monism or linguistic idealism, for the communication that is transacted in the shared performances of embodied selves can occur by means other than speech and writing. Embodied selves exist because of their relation in communication: they are relational selves. Finally, there are no bodies that are only women's bodies: bodies are not only sexed and gendered, they are also rich, poor, white, black, Asian, Native American, criminal, law-abiding, large, small, Catholic, Protestant, Hebrew, Muslim, a member of a familiar religious group or not a member of any such group. This means that one cannot limit the scope of her political or moral concern simply to women.

This does not mean, of course, that women whose bodies are assigned identities in addition to being females have not, as females, been subjected to power in ways that male bodies, as males, have not. But we are never just female or male bodies, and the tensions and conflicts between our sexual and gendered identities provide occasions for resistance to our being subjected to power.

Neither does this mean that the thinkers those who have advanced philosophy beyond Modernity by appealing to ancient Greek notions of embodied performers of meaning have not acted and written in ways that maintain or produce the subjection of female bodies, whatever other identities these bodies may possess. But we must not confuse the fixity that texts possess as inscribed with the meanings of the inscribed texts, for texts have multiple meanings and allow multiple readings, as do the bodies of many identities for which texts are metaphors. Finally, in no way should we minimize or discount the fact that female bodies in Classical Antiquity were constructed in ways that made them subject to domination and limited in the ways in which they were productive of power. The production of sexed and gendered bodies in ancient Greece is far too complex a subject to enter into here. One need only think of the way in which female bodies were portrayed in *muthos* that was performed by male bodies, portrayals and performances that are contested at times by the *logos* of philosophers. But that is another discussion for another time.

Notes

[1] Margaret McLaren, *Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity* (New York: SUNY Press, 2002): 3

[2] McLaren 3.

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Book Symposium

Michael Ruse, *Darwin and Design: Does Evolution Have a Purpose?* (Harvard UP, 2003)

Introduction

Dan White, *Florida International University*

This promises to be an interesting session based on the book by Professor Ruse. Professor Ruse has published numerous books and articles on Darwinian biology: *The Evolution Wars, The Philosophy of Biology, Can a Darwinian be a Christian?, Monad to Man: The Concept of Progress in Evolutionary Biology, Mystery of Mysteries: Is Evolution a Social Construction?* and *Darwin and Design: Does Evolution have a Purpose?* The focus of today is the third work in a trilogy. It began with *Monad to Man*, continued with *Mystery of Mysteries*, and is completed with this book, *Darwin and Design*: *Does Evolution have a Purpose?* Michael Ruse is the founder and original editor of the *Biology and Philosophy* journal.

Author's Opening Remarks

Michael Ruse, *Florida State University*

It is interesting that you mention a trilogy. I thought of it as *Lord of the Rings*. I must apologize for my appearance–lots of Brits and Aussies have a dress code, but David and I are making a protest. Inside we are wearing blazers and grey slacks. Thanks for inviting me, and I can't believe I'm ending my life. All Canadians turn 60 and retire and go to Florida. I hope to get some shuffleboard in today. This is part of an overall trilogy and in a way the book was slightly accidental. What I decided twenty years ago—during the generation when Kuhn was the big name in philosophy of science—was that we had to take history of science seriously to do good philosophy of science. I didn't want to end on my deathbed without being a contender. Why didn't I take on a big project? I could have been a contender. I tried to work on the big project of the question of science and values. I would work on evolutionary theory. I look upon *Darwin and Design* very much as a final part of the project. I try to understand whether or not science is value impregnated, not with epistemic values, but with the sorts of things that historians or social constructivists take seriously. So the first book, the big book, is very much on the whole idea of progress from monads to humans and humans up to Englishmen. This was part of evolutionary theory, and the extent to which it gets expelled over time. Then I wrote *Mystery of Mysteries*, which was a quickie cadet version of that for

the scientists, looking at the question of whether science is subjective or objective, and I thought I finished that. And then the John Templeton Foundation offered a $100,000 award for books on the following topics, and I thought, "Oh, Shit" and cancelled it and then ten minutes later with my desperate computer inadequacy was trying to find where I cancelled it, and I looked at it and it said one of the topics is teleology and purpose, and I said that award has my name on it, and to make a long story short, I did get the money, and that's why I wrote this book. And if there is a god—he, she, it— was designing me to write that particular book. I do feel that it is one that I enjoyed writing, and I felt I had to write. I've written others and haven't felt that way at all, and certainly others don't have to read them, but I just want you to buy them.

What is *Darwin and Design?* It is on the whole question of teleology and it does have some of the stuff that philosophers have worried about—for example, whether or not you can cash out teleological language in non-teleological language—but if there is a theme to it, it is captured in the phrase from Richard Dawkins at the beginning of the *Blind Watchmaker*. There Dawkins says that before Darwin it was impossible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist. Basically, that is what the book is about. Is that true? Did Darwin do something to the argument from design that Hume didn't? Then what did he do to it? Did Darwin make it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist? Did Darwin make it necessary to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist? Basically, that's what the book is all about, that is the crux of the book.

The book leads historically. I show that the argument from design is more interesting than what I have been teaching in philosophy classes for 35-38 years now, and I try to show that there are all sorts of social and other sorts of aspects about it. For instance, the argument from design in England: one of the reasons why Hume's criticism of it didn't work was that the argument from design had a very strong social function to prop up the kind of Protestantism that was very important to England that was being threatened by the Continent. It sounds awfully constructivist but it is true. But then I do think that Darwin does do something to the argument from design, and Dawkins is right, it is possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist. Darwin gives us a non-teleological way of explaining what goes back to the Greeks, and that I think needs explaining, namely, what Dawkins calls organized or apparently organized complexity. An interesting question is whether there is any place for teleological language and thought after Darwin, and what I want to argue is yes, I think there is. In this sense, I am a non-reductionist. Although a complete reductionist when it comes to molecules and souls and all those sorts of things, I am a non-reductionist in the sense that I think there is something distinct about biology not to be found in the physical sciences, namely this metaphor of design or artifact, because I think that organisms are design like and I think that biologists, as Kant rightly pointed out, not only use the design metaphor but they cannot not use it—it is not just a theoretical luxury, where one can say "ok we'll use it now but we can really get rid of it when we write our papers for *Nature and Science*; we'll just use it as a

heuristic." It is deeply in the fabric of our thinking, and our thinking about organisms. And what I argue in the second half of the book is that it is right there in biological thinking and very important and philosophers should recognize this.

Philosophers have faced a problem as logical empiricists—we feel that somehow science shouldn't have values, and so what we are trying to do is offer analyses, science without values. What I want to argue, going back to a distinction that Nagel makes, is that it is ok to have evaluation, it is values that we worry about. I think that teleology involves certain kinds of notions of what is good for things, not necessarily what is good in the sense of the City of God, or something like that, but what is good within a certain sort of context. We shouldn't eliminate that. I think it is absolutely crucial to the doing of science.

Right at the end of the book, I talk about what is apparently not for philosophers but more for people out in the real world, namely, what does all this add up to in the context of religion? Those of you who know about me know that I spent a lot of time fighting creationists. So I don't think that it gives warrant for so called intelligent design—which is the big thing these days. But I think that Dawkins, who says it is necessary to be an atheist, is wrong. Although I am not religious myself, I think that there is lots of opportunity for people who are religious to have a teleological perspective on the world, but it is going to be as the theologians say; it's not going to be a natural theology where you prove god, but rather what Tannenberg calls a theology of nature, as somebody who believes that nature can make meaningful to you your religious experiences. With that I'll shut up and sit down.

Book Symposium

Michael Ruse, *Darwin and Design: Does Evolution Have a Purpose?* (Harvard UP, 2003)

Purposiveness is not Paradoxical: All Living Organisms are Teleological, and That's the Origin of All "Value," from Amoebas to Humans

Ronnie Hawkins, *University of Central Florida*

I'll start off by saying that I am certainly not one of the logical positivists, and I agree with Ruse that many people in philosophy are coming from that point of view. My background is in biology and zoology, with a degree in medicine. I came to philosophy later in life, primarily motivated by my deep concern over what we are doing to the natural world. The environment is being radically disrupted by what I'm starting to call a massive failure of taking responsibility on the part of our present leaders, and interestingly enough Holmes Rolston was one of my guiding lights in searching for answers to the particular concern that brought me to philosophy: I think it is deeply immoral that our species is driving other species into extinction. Biologically speaking, this is a much larger, egregious wrong worse than genocide—which we all think is a much larger than homicide—in terms of destroying not just whole groups of humans, but entire taxonomic groups of organisms. And we really have to take responsibility for our role in that process and turn it around.

This leads me to my central critique. I heartily agree with the last few paragraphs of this book. I have never been an adherent of a formal religion, and I thank my parents for not filling my head with a lot of nonsense from which I could not later escape—many people spend their lives trying to escape from that. But they did allow me to fill myself with a deep reverence for the natural world. So I fully agree with the last few pages of *Darwin and Design* that discuss a return to an appreciation of "the complex, adaptive glory of the living world," rejoicing and trembling before it. We need that. We need to bring religion and biology, and all of science, together. I also agree with the idea of teleology in nature—we have to deal with it, it is very real, and we are all living proof of that. We are biological organisms who have our own goals and purposes; we are teleological, and our fundamental goals as biological organisms are to maintain ourselves—to prevent ourselves from dying—and to reproduce. Those are fundamental to all biological organisms; and beyond that, as humans, we have lots of other purposes that we further elaborate. But I'm trying to stay at the level

of what we share, and to me the most basic theme coming from Charles Darwin is not even natural selection, which I agree is important, but the evolutionary continuity of all living things, the incredibly deep connectedness that we all share.

I just came back from a sabbatical, and spent much of my time last year reconnecting with what I studied during my science education. There are some marvelous books out now on cell biology, genetics, and embryological development. We are now at the stage where our technology lets us visualize the actual, organized movements of molecules—take the motor proteins, for example, that all living things basically share. There are only a handful of them—myosin, kinesin, dynein—they move along actin filaments or walk along microtubules, one kind going one way and one going another. We can see this happen; we have electron micrographs of the power stroke of dynein, for instance, the energy-expending change of shape that makes it take a "step." This is very exciting to me. And when you read further about the motor proteins, when you read about the highly conserved nature of most genes and proteins, you learn that not only are they shared by all vertebrates, they are shared by invertebrate animals life and by plants and fungi as well—they are shared by all eukaryotic organisms, all organisms that have DNA enclosed by a nuclear membrane. This is evolutionary continuity writ large, for all to see.

And I think that if we stick with the idea of evolutionary continuity, there is no problem with teleology. We are fully aware as humans that we share in teleology, we have "purposes." The problem that some people have with extending teleology to the rest of life—the problem that I see, coming from environmental philosophy—is a result of anthropocentrism. Somehow, you want to allow for *human* choice and *human* purpose but you want to exclude most of the rest of the living world—maybe allowing for the other primates, or at least the great apes, to have purpose and choice, but only for them—while there is really continuity all the way down. You look at an amoeba reaching out a pseudopod toward a food particle, trying to maintain its life, and that is an example of it valuing something that helps support its life, that is a rudimentary form of choice—maybe not "conscious" choice in our human sense, but the early beginnings of that kind of choice. You have value and choice and teleology all the way from the amoeba to the human, and once you recognize that, you have no problem with teleology or purposiveness in biology being paradoxical—it's not. It is really there, in all living things.

Of course, talking about teleology for organisms is not the same as talking about teleology for the entire universe. And I'm not going to try to make *that* case. Although I will say there are people who are working on that—people at the Santa Fe Institute, Stuart Kauffman, Steven Strogatz, and others—and I'm beginning to believe there *are* larger patterns in the universe. There *is,* as Kauffman says, "order for free." Read the books on cell biology—it used to be, when I was going through school, that we knew the primary structure of proteins, what amino acids went together in linear order, but we didn't know much about the secondary and tertiary structure. We

do now, and we can look at it now, and talk about things like how the active site of an enzyme is turned on and off by a few configurational changes, what genes turn it on and off, what transcription factors control these genes, and so on. There is a lot of "order for free" out there—it comes from the way molecules assemble themselves, for one thing, and so we're already way beyond the "billiard ball" model of physics where what happens is reducible to isolated, atomistic particles bouncing off one another. There is much more going on than that, lots of very complex interactions that produce larger patterns, eventually resulting in *life* as an anentropic, self-maintaining phenomenon.

My final point has to do with metaphor. We don't have to think of the purposiveness of biological organisms as just a metaphor—it's real. But I do think we have to recognize that human beings think largely metaphorically. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, for example, have been putting out a lot of recent material arguing that even what we think of as abstract logic may very well relate to bodily metaphors, to our human embodiment. You know, perhaps I learned my syllogistic thinking when I was 4 or 5 years old—that I could put a pea in a cup, and I put the cup in a Tupperware container, that I could see that *the pea* was also *in the container*—OK, that's the kind of bodily, real-world understanding, that gets translated into logic, using the "container" metaphor. We are biological beings, we are not little point-minds like Descartes thought, but unfortunately I see a lot of analytic philosophy, as well as logical positivism, still coming from that kind of disembodied position. You folks who think this way may need to go back and take a course in biology, in order to put us back in the picture as embodied, biological beings. But acknowledging our use of metaphor helps us to make sense, anthropologically, of some still-pervasive religious views. Two thousand years ago we humans, or the people who wrote the books in patriarchal societies, male human beings, thought that, oh, there is all of this order in the universe—it is there to be seen—and so there must be some big male human being in the sky that's as powerful as we male human beings are on earth, to have put this all together. As a metaphor, it was a way that people then could understand how all this happened, how all this order came to be. I am urging that we now update ourselves. We have had two thousand years of science since that time, we understand how life has evolved, and we can hold onto "design" insofar as this indicates order and the teleology of organisms, and just get rid of what I'm calling anthropocentrism, assuming that "value" and "purpose" can only be associated with human beings. And then we can go back to having reverence for the natural world—which includes us and all other teleological, purposive, living organisms—and stop destroying it.

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Book Symposium

Michael Ruse, *Darwin and Design: Does Evolution Have a Purpose?* (Harvard UP, 2003)

Where Does Teleological Thinking Stand Today? Reinterpreting Ruse's *Darwin and Design*

Paul Draper, *Florida International University*

The main focus of Michael Ruse's excellent book, *Darwin and Design*, is a question about biology: if Darwin's theory of natural selection eliminates the need to understand the living world teleologically, then why does function-talk persist in contemporary evolutionary biology? The book professes to address a broader question as well, namely, where does teleological or design-like thinking stand today, in both science and philosophy? Because of its focus on evolutionary biology and not on origin-of-life theory or cosmology or philosophy of religion, the book does not provide a complete answer to this broader question, as Ruse admits in his preface. He suggests, however, that his conclusions could be reinterpreted in terms that would be pertinent to the issues he does not address. I intend to offer just such a reinterpretation here, focusing in particular on contemporary arguments from design. For reasons that will soon be clear, however, it is unlikely that Ruse would offer the same reinterpretation.

Ruse looks to history for help in answering his questions, and that is where I will begin as well. According to Ruse, the classic argument from design has two stages. The first is an argument based on our observations of nature for the conclusion that adaptive complexity is exhibited, not just by human contrivances, but also by other parts of nature or even by the natural world taken as a whole. The second is an argument from natural adaptive complexity to one or more intelligent designers of that complexity. Plato defends both stages of this argument, ultimately arguing for a "Demiurge" who, guided by the world of Forms, imposes order on a pre-existing world of becoming.[1] Aristotle accepts the first stage of the argument, but not the second. He believes that teleological order has always existed; thus, he feels no need to reduce final causes to intentions that make reference to the future but exist prior to their effects.[2] Ancient atomists represent a third option, denying that adaptive complexity is eternal, but rejecting intelligent design in favor of pure chance.[3]

Now let's fast forward a couple millennia to David Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*.[4] The character Cleanthes believes that complex mechanical order can be observed throughout nature. The world as a whole, he says, is a "machine," which is divided into smaller machines, which in turn are made up of even smaller machines, and so on. Philo challenges Cleanthes' claim that the world as a whole is machine-like, but in Part XII he admits that various organic systems are genuine examples of adaptive complexity. Instead of concluding, however, as Cleanthes does, that these organic systems were intelligently designed, Philo draws a more cautious conclusion, namely, that the causes of mechanical order within nature probably bear *some* analogy to the causes of machines.

Given this more modest conclusion, do we still want to call Philo's argument an argument from design? If we do, then we must, I believe, add something to what Ruse says about the significance of Darwin's theory for the argument from design. Darwin's theory of natural selection may refute the *classic* argument from design, as Ruse says; but it also vindicates Philo's argument from design, or at least its conclusion, since organic systems and machines are both produced by a process of imperfect replication and selection. In the case of machines, the process is one of trial and error, a combination of replication with non-random variation and conscious selection. For example, human designers are not capable of building a complex machine like a Sopwith Camel from scratch. Rather, they start with the plane built by the Wright brothers, then replicate that plane with variations they think might improve performance, preserving what works in future generations and discarding what doesn't. Thus, one way that the causes of mechanical order in the living world could bear an analogy to the causes of machines and yet not involve conscious intentions is by involving replication with random variation and non-conscious selection. Such a process will be much slower than the process by which the airplane has evolved, but it will be analogous. Therefore, Darwin's theory showed that the causes of organic systems really are analogous to the causes of machines, just as Philo, and probably Hume as well, had concluded.

Of course, just because Philo's conclusion is true doesn't mean that his argument is a good one. Ruse, however, holds two related views that support the position that Philo's inference is correct. First, he believes that the way the parts of organic systems are ordered is strikingly similar to the way that the parts of machines are ordered and plainly dissimilar to the way matter is ordinarily arranged in nature. Second, he holds, no doubt partly on the basis of the first view, that this sort of order, this adaptive complexity, demands a very special sort of explanation. These two views support the position that Philo's argument is a good one, that living things and machines really are relevantly similar, and that it follows from this similarity that their causes probably resemble each other in some substantial way.

It is somewhat risky, however, for a naturalist to accept this position. To see why, more history is needed. As Ruse notes, it was widely believed by Darwin's time that adaptive complexity

is limited to the living world and human contrivances. It was also widely believed that cells are relatively simple things. The cell theory had been formulated in the 1830s, and some biologists believed that the cell wall and nucleus were functionally important. But others, like T. H. Huxley, believed that the half liquid contents of the cell are the "physical basis of life."[5] According to this "protoplasmic theory of life," the first life forms or proto-life forms on earth were just lumps of protoplasm that, despite their homogeneity, were nevertheless capable of nutrition and reproduction.[6] If life could be as simple as this, then by providing an account of how complex life could evolve from simple life, Darwin appeared to have explained all of the adaptive complexity in the natural world.

Advances in science since Darwin, however, have disturbed this tidy picture. Many philosophers and scientists now claim to find adaptive complexity in two parts of nature that at least appear to fall outside of the reach of Darwin's theory in its contemporary form. First, biologists and biochemists tell us that an individual living cell is itself a highly structured system, one that displays complex mechanical order just as much as larger biological systems. This raises the question of how the first life on earth (which I will call "primitive life") came into existence. Part of the problem is that natural selection seems to depend on the existence of a genetic system composed of nucleic acids and capable of self-replication, but any such system already displays adaptive complexity. Origin-of-life researchers have many theories, but all of these theories face serious obstacles, and nothing like a consensus has emerged. In fact, researchers don't even agree on such basic issues as whether a genetic system or a metabolic cycle was the first step on the way to life. Second, physicists tell us that certain physical parameters of the universe are fine-tuned for the existence of life. To say that a physical parameter like the gravitational constant or the mass of the proton or the rate of expansion of the big bang is "fine-tuned for life" is to say that the range of values of that parameter that are life-permitting (i.e. that do not entail the physical impossibility of life assuming no changes to other parameters) is very small compared to the range of all theoretically possible values of that parameter. Many physicists seem to regard this fine-tuning as an instance of adaptive complexity, or at least as something that, like adaptive complexity, needs a special explanation; but there is no agreement on what that explanation is.

Assume that primitive life and cosmic fine-tuning really are examples of adaptive complexity. Then the position that Philo's argument is a good one threatens to have consequences which metaphysical naturalists will find unpalatable. For that position implies that the causes of all instances of adaptive complexity, including newly discovered ones, are probably analogous to the causes of machines; and just because it was possible at the time of Darwin to accept this analogy without positing supernatural intelligence does not guarantee that this is possible today. I doubt Ruse would be sympathetic to such radical suggestions. More than twenty years ago he claimed that science by definition deals only with the natural, which implies that no explanation that makes

reference to the supernatural is scientific.[7] In *Darwin and Design*, he praises Aristotle for recognizing that "a designing mind as such can have no place in science."[8] But even if Ruse's claim about the definition of "science" is correct, it does not follow that methodological naturalism is true—that we should never appeal to the supernatural in our attempts to explain the natural. For the issue here is not a verbal one—the issue is not how the word "science" is properly used.[9] Rather, the issue is whether or not people who investigate the causes of natural events should look only for naturalistic causes or also for supernaturalistic ones. Whether one interprets this issue as the question of whether scientists should broaden their *scientific* investigations or as the question of whether scientists should broaden their investigations beyond the boundaries of science will depend, of course, on the definition of "science." But the definition won't settle the issue. My own view is that a weak form of methodological naturalism is justified by the success in both science and everyday life of finding good naturalistic explanations of natural phenomena. Such success supports the view, which I call "modest methodological naturalism," that, prior to investigation, a natural phenomenon is very likely to have a natural cause and hence appeals to the supernatural are justified only as a last resort. (By "supernatural" entities, I mean entities that are neither ontologically nor causally reducible to the entities studied by physical scientists and yet can causally influence such entities.) Let's assume the truth of my modest methodological naturalism and examine the cases of primitive life and cosmic fine-tuning in the light of Philo's argument.

Just as Plato and Aristotle reject the ancient atomists' attempt to explain adaptive complexity by appealing to the random clumping of atoms, so too almost all origin of life researchers reject the view, held by such prominent scientists as Jacques Monod and even Richard Dawkins, that the order in the first living thing can plausibly be attributed to a highly improbable chance event, a single random collision of molecules.[10] Such an event is simply too improbable to take seriously, which is to say that, once again, adaptive complexity calls for a special sort of explanation. Should, then, we agree with Philo that the causes of primitive life are probably analogous to the causes of machines? I'm inclined to say "yes." But notice that this does not mean we must agree with Cleanthes that supernatural intelligence is involved. Whether one accepts an "RNA world" scenario or a metabolism first view, non-genetic natural selection may play a crucial role in one's theory. Granted, advocates of the RNA first view sometimes defend that view by claiming that RNA had to appear first so that natural selection can begin to operate; but it seems likely that they must ultimately postulate a previously existing biochemical world in which non-genetic natural selection leads to RNA. How does non-genetic natural selection work in this case? We don't know yet, but if we agree with Philo's argument and also maintain modest methodological naturalism, then even in the absence of any consensus on the details we should conclude that natural selection is the most likely explanation of adaptive complexity in primitive life.

What about cosmic fine tuning? Here the claim that adaptive complexity is present is much more controversial than in the case of primitive life. One difference is that we can observe other physical objects besides machines and living things and in this way learn that the order machines and living things exhibit is very unusual and so in need of special explanation. But even if there are other universes, we cannot observe them, making it difficult to justify the claim that the values of the physical parameters of our universe are "unusual." On the other hand, many of the values of these parameters involve asymmetries or seem in some other way to be "unnatural" or less "simple" and hence intrinsically less probable than other theoretically possible values. This is, I believe, part of the reason that so many physicists and philosophers find an appeal to brute fact in the cosmic case so unsatisfying.

What sort of explanations of cosmic fine tuning have been offered? Some philosophers and scientists have appealed to supernatural intelligence. Notice that such an appeal in the cosmic case is not as blatant a violation of modest methodological naturalism as in the origin-of-life case. For the most general features of the universe, especially ones that may not follow from physical law, are just the sort of features that are most plausibly accounted for by a *non-intervening* creator's activity. Others have tried to explain cosmic fine-tuning by appealing to multiple universes. Interestingly, many of these appeals parallel the ancient atomists' attempt to explain biological order. The claim is that vastly many, or even infinitely many, universes exist, or have existed in succession, and that the values of the relevant physical parameters vary randomly from one universe to another. Thus, it is not surprising that one or more universes would have the values needed for life, and it is not surprising that the universe we observe is one of the life-permitting ones, because we could not exist in any of the others. This sounds an awful lot like: there are vastly or infinitely many atoms that randomly form different arrangements with each other. Thus, given enough time, it is inevitable that our world would exhibit adaptive complexity, and it is not surprising that we happen to observe the world when it is so ordered because our existence depends on that order. If we find the atomists' explanation inadequate, then perhaps we should also reject the common multiple universes explanation.

Is there some other option besides an appeal to supernatural intelligence or chance? Or does agreement with Philo's argument from design (combined with the assumption that cosmic fine-tuning really is an example of adaptive complexity) commit us to concluding that the universe was intelligently designed? One interesting option that is not popular among physicists, but which anyone who defends both Philo's argument from design and methodological naturalism should find at least initially attractive, is a multi-universe theory independently suggested by the philosopher Quentin Smith and the physicist Lee Smolin.[11] Smith and Smolin suggest that a universe is produced when the black hole of a parent universe collapses. If its physical parameters are near their "natural" values, then the universe will not inflate or will inflate without producing black holes and so will

have no offspring. If, on the other hand, a universe's physical parameters are more like the values in our universe, then it will have offspring. These offspring will tend to resemble their parent, although mutations are possible because, when a black hole collapses, fluctuations resulting from the state of high entropy inside the hole can scramble the physical parameters of the parent universe that would otherwise be passed on to its offspring.

According to this theory, it is natural selection that accounts for cosmic fine-tuning. The physical parameters of a universe are its cosmic genes, which are replicated, often imperfectly, in the next generation of universes. Because the values that result in more black holes and hence more offspring are the "unnatural" ones that are also necessary for life, universes with unnatural physical parameters are ultimately selected and eventually predominate, making the existence of life-permitting universes much less surprising. Of course, life is, in a sense, epiphenomenal on this theory – the universe is really fine-tuned for black hole production—but this is just a cosmic version of Darwin's "principle of "correlated variation."[12] If Smith and Smolin's theory turns out to be true, then Philo's argument will be vindicated once again, and once again such vindication will not require believing in supernatural intelligence.

My aim in this paper has been to extend and, in the case of Hume, modify Ruse's history of the argument from design in an effort to shed light on contemporary design arguments. My conclusion is that Ruse is right when he says that the past, even if it doesn't answer all of our present questions about teleological thinking, does suggest interesting directions for answering them. As I mentioned earlier, however, I doubt Ruse would be willing to travel in the same directions I do. His adherence to strict methodological naturalism blocks his way. Because I accept only a modest methodological naturalism, I take the possibility of a successful argument from design very seriously. This means that theories like Darwin's and perhaps even Smith and Smolin's have a starring instead of a merely supporting role to play in the justification of a naturalistic worldview.

Notes

[1] Michael Ruse, *Darwin and Design: Does Evolution Have a Purpose?* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard UP, 2003): 12-17.

[2] Ruse, 17-19.

[3] Ruse, 11-12.

[4]David Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, ed. Martin Bell (New York: Penguin Books, 1990).

[5] Iris Fry, *The Emergence of Life on Earth: A Historical and Scientific Overview* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers UP, 2000): 57.

[6] Fry, 57-59.

[7] Ruse, 322.

[8] Ruse, 19.

[9] Alvin Plantinga, Methodological naturalism?, *Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith* 49 (1997): 146.

[10] Fry, 193-197.

[11] Quentin Smith, "A Natural Explanation of the Existence and Laws of Our Universe," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 68.1 (March 1990) 22-43; and Lee Smolin, *The Life of the Cosmos* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997).

[12]Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species* (New York: The New American Library, 1958): 34-35.

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In Memoriam
Stephen B. Levensohn, 1931-2004

Stephen B. Levensohn, Professor of Philosophy, Humanities and Religious Studies at the University of Central Florida, passed away on June 16, 2004, at Winter Park Hospital in Winter Park, Florida. Professor Levensohn had taught at the University of Central Florida in Orlando, Florida for 35 years. He was 73.

Originally from Boston, Professor Levensohn spent 4 years in the Air Force, mostly in North Africa, from 1952-1956. Subsequently, he took his bachelor's degree in philosophy at Boston University and both his M.A. and Ph.D. at Florida State University. Dr. Levensohn held a Post Doctorate from Jewish Theological Seminary. In 1969, he joined the faculty of Florida Technological University (later to become the University of Central Florida).

During his teaching career at the University of Central Florida, Professor Levensohn touched the lives of many students. Not infrequently, one would find a long line of students in the Philosophy Department office waiting to speak with him. Even when teaching large classes, Professor Levensohn would often insist that each student in each of his classes make a personal visit to his office during the semester. These visits were not perfunctory, but often lasted an hour or more, as Professor Levensohn had a genuine interest in getting to know each one of the hundreds of students enrolled in his classes. And because of the genuine interest Professor Levensohn took in their lives, many students would return to his office several times during the semester and continue to seek his advice long after they had completed his class.

In addition to classroom teaching, Professor Levensohn was the founder and original Director of Religious Studies at the University of Central Florida. He was also the first faculty advisor for the Black Student Union when there were no Black professors. Together with his wife, Kate, he delighted his radio listeners and callers as the gravelly voiced Harriet of "Aunt Harriet's All Night Diner" and later, the issue-oriented WUCF program "Practical Wisdom." He also established Philosophy Practicum, a program that sent university students to mentor at-risk youth in the Winter Park Housing Authority and similar organizations in Volusia and Brevard counties.

Professor Levensohn retired from full-time teaching last June. A dedicated teacher who loved his students, he continued to teach in an adjunct capacity, however, and was expecting to begin his next class on June 24.

Professor Levensohn is survived by his wife, Kate Levensohn; his daughters Jaimie Morris, Elizabeth Levensohn, Tia Llewellyn, Alexis Rosenfelt; his son Todd Levensohn; his sister Maxine Wientraub, and twelve grandchildren. Family was an important value to Professor Levensohn and

he will be greatly missed by all of his extended family, including the many friends who were adopted into his family and always made to feel welcome at large family gatherings and celebrations.

In recognition of Professor Levensohn's commitment to students, his family has established the Stephen B. Levensohn Scholarship/Memorial Fund at UCF. In lieu of flowers, donations may be sent to The Stephen B. Levensohn Scholarship/Memorial Fund, UCF Foundation, 12424 Research Parkway, Suite 140, Orlando, FL 32826.

Shelley Park and Nancy Stanlick,
University of Central Florida

Book Symposium

Margaret McLaren. *Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity* (SUNY Press, 2002)

Response by Author and Discussion

Margaret McLaren: I want to thank Dr Jaeger and Dr. Waugh for their remarks and to thank Dr. Park for organizing the symposium. I will say just a couple of things. In general, I agree with the comments, questions, and issues raised by Suzanne and Joanne, but I want to respond to two main points. Dr. Jaeger points out that Foucault doesn't acknowledge his own perspectivalness. Yet because he argues that knowledge is partial, he needs to look at the ways in which his own critique is partial and perspectival in order to be consistent. There are places where he does that, mainly in his interviews. As I argue in my book, Foucault's interviews and essays provide important information about how he viewed his own work. When Foucault was asked about possible directions for particular political projects, he would say he didn't want to propose a project because he's only one person with a limited perspective. He refused to impose his own agenda because it had a particular point of view. He was often criticized for this lack of a definitive response. Yet if we take the remarks he made in his interviews as guides to reading his texts, such as *History of Sexuality*, *Discipline and Punish*, *Archaeology of Knowledge* and *The Order of Things*, it is clear that Foucault acknowledges that he was offering only a partial perspective.

The other thing that I think could bear some discussion is what norms should and can be critiqued. This is a huge issue not just for Foucault, but also within feminist theory itself. Dr. Jaeger raises a relevant and interesting, but complicated, question when she asks when we should privilege the first rather than the third person perspective. The sex wars debate in feminist theory raised this question about a number of controversial practices that women engage in—sadomasochism, prostitution, dancing at a strip club. The debate fell along these lines: liberal feminists advocated the first person perspective, they argued that so long as you are making the choice you can do what you want, whereas radical feminists were more inclined to privilege a third person perspective, they were willing to say that certain things are just bad for women because they are repressive. But I think that Foucault doesn't fall cleanly along those lines. His idea of resistance to norms does not seem to unequivocally privilege the first person or the third person perspective. It is not just based in choice or autonomy, so it is not solely in the first person perspective. But it certainly is not in the third person perspective that prescribes what is good for others. Using gender roles for example, I think that his idea of resistance is not that I have to resist notions of being a homemaker, nor that I need

to resist notions of particular types of female sexuality by not working at a strip club. In other words, resisting norms is not simply about blindly rejecting stereotypical or conventional gender roles, nor is it about uncritically embracing transgressive ones. There is room to take up your own projects in your own way that are transgressive, but they don't have to be transgressive in the same way or in one particular way. It depends on the norms. But there are norms that are always oppressive in relation to certain people, for example, heterosexuality. Foucault was gay, and he died of AIDS. Heterosexuality is a norm that is systematically oppressive to those who are gay and lesbian. There are certain norms that if you are not in the majority, it is actually very productive to resist them. It might be necessary to your own survival. You might need to resist those norms. But Foucault doesn't just talk about social norms in one way, and the last thing I'll say about norms is about Dr. Jaeger's improvisational theatre examples, which I really like.

As I was writing the book and thinking about norms it became clear that Foucault's own position on this issue is very complicated, and because of this, often misunderstood. It seems clear that Foucault doesn't mean that we always resist norms, because communication would completely break down. We exist in world of background assumptions. There is some differentiation in his work between these norms that are constitutive for social interaction and norms that are oppressive, and if you turn to his later work, he doesn't condemn norms constitutive of communication and social life. In order to draw out this distinction, I turn to sociologists about norms in my book. So I think Foucault's position on this is more moderate than most people think. He criticizes some norms, but not all of them. For instance, I doubt he would object to the ones that enable communication to go farther as in the improvisational theatre examples.

The last point I would like to address is the idea that there are bases other than aggression and conflict for social interaction and the development of subjectivity. Here I agree with Suzanne (and maybe against Foucault) that subjectivity is not defined solely in an agonistic relationship–a kind of conflictual relationship. This position that subjectivity and relations with others are conflictual or strategic is mainly found in his middle works. But he moves away from this toward the end of his life in his later works. Unfortunately, until recently these later works have largely been neglected. In his later works he says many things that are more positive about social relationships. For instance, he talks about friendship as a model of a social relation in Volumes 2 and 3 of *History of Sexuality*. And he talks about care of self and care of others as a relational social practice that involves other people. So if we consider his later works along with his genealogical works he discusses both negative and positive social relations. Although the discussion of positive forms of social relation and self relation, such as friendship and self-care may not be developed to the degree that we would want; it is in there. It is unfortunate that he died so early. He was still working on his ethical works.

I like the way Dr. Waugh tries to extend the project. I tried to write in a way that would be accessible to a wide audience, including Analytic and Continental philosophers, as well as non-philosophers. One of the reasons for this is that my interests are wide ranging including contemporary French theory and existentialism as well as traditional political theory. One of the things that drove my research on Foucault, besides the notion of subjectivity, was trying to unravel some of the philosophical mistakes I see in the Enlightenment legacy, for instance, the notion of autonomy that denies social context. But I think Foucault's turn back to antiquity, like some other philosophers return to it, is to get at some things that are important and essential about the social and political embeddedness of moral agency; it is not just abstract, not just voluntarism. Our actions are always in relation. To think of a self that is constituted through social norms yet able to resist them avoids the stark contrast between an unconnected self and a completely embedded one. So the return to antiquity is very important in Foucault's work.

Joanne Waugh: One of the things that I didn't say quite explicitly was the extent to which some of the feminist criticisms of Foucault against which McLaren defends are red herrings, and they are so because people have a tendency not to read Foucault as a historicist and with insufficient attention to concepts of aesthetics. That's one of the reasons I went in the direction that I did. In reaction to Suzanne, I think the criticism about Foucault's notion about norms being partial and perspectival tends to come perilously close to the idea that the self as a knower is prior to or independent of history. We make history as much as history makes us. And so it is far more difficult to be perspectival in an original way than some feminist critics have suggested. It is true that his analysis of subjectivity is male subjectivity. But that doesn't mean that his position is not of use. And Foucault's position as gay in relation to other dominant identities provides him with a kind of double-aspect vision that we find discussed in DuBois and others who talk about stories that are told about them and the ones they say about themselves. Another point I think is important, one stemming from study of Greek society, is that we shouldn't view the agonistic aspects of Foucault in a Hobbesian way. What Foucault is talking about is mastery over self. For Foucault, as for Nietzsche, the mastery over self is the most agonistic thing in which we engage. We may bring others in and others threaten one's mastery of the self, but I don't think the agonistic aspect of Foucault is particularly Hobbesian.

Suzanne Jaeger: When you say that the norm of heterosexuality is oppressive, I balk at this over generalized way of talking. The term may be taken to refer only to a certain kind of sexual practice, or it may be understood to refer also to the state oppression of any other kind of sexual practices. We need a more refined way of discussing the various aspects of the concept of heterosexual normativity. There are contexts in which heterosexuality is not an oppressive norm, but an option among other sexual practices.

Margaret McLaren: I say it is oppressive for homosexuals, but I am willing to qualify that. I am willing to look at the ways in which it is or is not oppressive. It is obviously a very complicated issue.

Suzanne Jaeger: We were going to talk about norms. We have to be refined and sophisticated about our characterizations of norms. When we use sweeping generalizations, we risk oversimplifying the issues.

Audience member: I have a kind of worry about this. Obviously, Foucault became a public intellectual and that doesn't happen to us. Though he thought of himself as a historian, he thought of himself as a traditional, scholarly historian. Given the role of being a public intellectual, he was constantly asked about things. Should we be so confident that the things he says in those interviews are the guide to the historical work? The historical work seems to me to be complicated. *The Birth of the Clinic* is about the history of medicine, but it is hard to understand what kind of political conclusion I would draw from the book. Did you find the dislocation of these interviews and these quite scholarly historical texts? He always said he was an historian.

Margaret McLaren: You'd have to say, "should we trust what he says in which interview?" He is not consistent in his interviews. In some of them, he talks about his own work, he's not always just asked about political situations like Iran and Poland. You need to have a general overview. I think the interviews can help guide a reading of his works, because he actually says sometimes that he is trying to make strategic interventions, writing so his works will be used politically, but he did not want to say how in particular. He was involved in many different political struggles and lived all over the place. He was involved in Polish solidarity; so some of his interviews are about solidarity. What I did in the book was not to look at particular situations, but the way in which his work should be read. Should we take him as the authority on the way his own work should be read? The fact that Foucault was a public intellectual and thus often discussed his own work during his lifetime should not lead us to dismiss what he said. The situation of the philosopher in France is so different; many are public intellectuals and are actively engaged in politics and public policy, including writing articles for the popular press. Taken together, his activism and social criticism provide a context in which his work can be read; I believe that his historical works have a political point. You asked what is the political message of *The Birth of the Clinic* because it is essentially a history of medicine. I agree that it has rich historical detail. But I think that there is also a political thesis—that is, we should not take current categories, and ways of doing things for granted, attention to the changes that have happened in the two hundred years Foucault covers in his book should make us aware that even the categories of science and medicine change. For instance, in *Madness and Civilization* he looked at the changes in the treatment of the mad. Even in contemporary society the protocol has changed, not too long ago lobotomies were considered a valid form of treatment for insanity, now they are considered inhumane. So, I think

one of the underlying political messages in many of Foucault's historical works, including*The Birth of the Clinic,* is to urge us to question authority, because the authority of accepted categories has changed historically. There are many cases where people thought they had the right answers, for instance, the medicalization of mental illness. These things have dramatic effects on people's lives. Recognize these things. We may not be at the apex of the historical trajectory. That's what I think his thesis is.

Audience member: I guess one thing I was interested in was transgressing norms. It seems like the general thrust of Foucault's work is to unsettle these norms in a way, but at the same time the norms define the ways in which they can be transgressed. They define the categories outside the boundaries. So it seems hard to transgress them. That might be why you have to do the genealogical and archaeological contexts. Looking at texts that no longer appear self-evident, we start to be able to see the categories. They start to unravel themselves. And so there is an importance to paying close attention to the determinate structure of the text or the argument. For example, in the *Phaedrus*, Socrates says the only way to get him out of the city is to write a speech and pull it out of the context, but to write it down and take it out of the bodily context, to decenter it, causes one to start to see things differently. And so maybe there is, in that sense, something really important about how texts are structured and how they fit into a particular context, but then they don't in another context.

Joanne Waugh: I think that is a lesson much learned; the lesson I want to impart is one about a text's multiple meanings, about texts as art, about the pleasure of texts– about texts as metaphors for bodies and bodies as performances that are never completely constrained despite the norms we extract from them. One thing I think Foucault is saying is that norms are extracted from bodies, from the performances of bodies. They can become ways of disciplining bodies. Just as the bodies of those who are privileged in one way recognize the ways in which their performances are productive of power Foucault knew both from being gay and from being an upper-class French person. African Americans recognize this with respect to performances in different contexts. If they are not speeding but stopped on that pretense, their identity as wealthy and educated is not an empowering fact in that context. So I think that the claim about how to escape is a mistaken emphasis. It seems to me that norms are never going to be completely determinate of individual bodies, and this is why I bring in Kristeva and others who talk about how bodies contest the norms—because they have other identities besides the particular identity into which they are being normalized at that time.

Margaret McLaren: One of the important things for me is that Foucault is doing social and political philosophy. There is no question about it–-he talks about material effects that not a lot of people do. Norms can't be escaped but are not all oppressive. There are a variety of norms that operate. *The Birth of the Clinic* looks at the way norms have operated in the past and it denaturalizes

things. And so it can allow you to look at particular practices both historical and contemporary—to get a new perspective, to discover assumptions that underlie particular practices.

Book Symposium

Michael Ruse, *Darwin and Design: Does Evolution Have a Purpose?* (Harvard UP, 2003)

Response by Author and Discussion

Michael Ruse: Normally we go through the conventional "thank you very much," and that is not useful. I feel unbowed. I think that some interesting questions have been raised today; however, I'm not sure they touch on my book particularly. I was very careful at the beginning of the book to cover my backside to say that I wasn't dealing with important issues, but that I was dealing narrow points or relatively narrow points, and I think there are other things that ought to be discussed and that have been discussed today.

I'll start with Ronnie's comments. My feeling is that you suffer from what I call "The Prince of Wales Fallacy." I do not mean this in a creditable way, if you knew what I thought about the present British royal family. I think that you are caught on this mushy-minded thinking that we should go out and hug a tree, if not for Jesus then because it is a good thing in itself. You mention Rolston who is very much a part of this whole picture. I am very strongly against anthropocentrism and certainly very strongly against the view that humans are in some sense the best or the natural evolutionary outcome, or whatever. Having said that, I totally fail to see any reason why we humans have any special obligation to the rest of the world. That does not mean that I approve of the energy bill that Bush and his cronies are pushing today, and I gather that people don't read Saturday newspapers, so don't misunderstand me, I don't want to say to go out and shoot the last panther. In fact, my license plate has a sea turtle on it. But I cannot see any arguments as I think you and Rolston want to get out of nature for saying that in some sense, everything has intrinsic worth. I take it that you want to separate yourself from Rolston in this point because he is quite openly a practicing Christian, and I take it that at least part of his argument would be that it is part of God's overall scheme, of which we are, too. But certainly, you and Ralston in his naturalistic moments want to argue that somehow there is an intrinsic worth or value in the world. And although I don't address this issue directly in this book or perhaps even in the other books, the whole philosophy I want to endorse is that there isn't that kind of value in the world.

I don't see that kind of value in human beings. I like human beings. I would rather sleep with human beings than with the smallpox or something like that, but ultimately, I am with Dawkins on this. I think nature is indifferent—he says "pitiless." I think nature just is. This does not mean to say that it is not open to me to read my own values into humans or into panthers. But to do so is

to commit the Prince of Wales Fallacy. Rolston thinks that because something exists in nature, it has some innate value. This is his argument against GM foods. It's unnatural, it's not what nature has produced. I think he commits a fundamental fallacy. This does not entail we cannot have values separate from nature. For instance, I am very glad that smallpox has been eliminated, even if it means the end of that species, if you want to call a virus a species.

Ronnie Hawkins: That means you *are* valuing human life—you see some value in human life.

Michael Ruse: I do value human life, but ultimately I am an emotivist or non-cognitivist. My values come from my emotions, and it comes from the way I am and what I want. It has burned into my brain. I think that you and Rolston are tying to find values in nature. You are looking for an objective value out there.

Ronnie Hawkins: I think that any life—any self-maintaining organism—is where "value" ultimately comes from—it "values" what contributes to its continuing to be alive. But that valuing doesn't have to be "conscious" in a human sense. That is the fundamental difference between you and me. You seem to think that "value" and "purpose" can only be attributed to a human-like consciousness—but then, where did we come by these abilities, if we ourselves are evolved beings? Value and purpose must have existed already in some form, in other life. But you would see other life forms as just machines, artifacts into which we humans only metaphorically impute "value" and "purpose," when in fact they're self-maintaining, valuing, purposeful systems in their own right.

Michael Ruse: I'm happy to say that.

Ronnie Hawkins: It is anthropocentric to think that value comes from us.

Michael Ruse: If that is anthropocentric, then I'm anthropocentric. But I'm not anthropocentric in even thinking that Michael Ruse is the end process of evolution that has led up to the goodies up there or something like that. Paul obviously overlaps very significantly. But let me just pick on Paul.

I'm inclined to think that Paul missed a major difference between Philo's type of manufacturing and Darwin's natural selection type of manufacturing. There may be an evolution in both cases, as with some organism–-the panther or something like that. But it seems to me the whole point about the Sopwith Camel is that although there is a kind of selection going on, there is an intention in the variation. So in other words, as people went from Wright's Kitty Hawk to the Sopwith Camel, although to a certain extent there is a trial and error in it, nevertheless, people are driven by the thought that we should do this because we think it will do something. In other words, the variations themselves are guided in some way. Whereas the whole point in Darwinian selection, although he didn't know about Mendelian mutations, is that those variations are random, not in the sense of uncaused, but in the sense of undesigned with respect to the needs of the possessor. So I

think it is an interesting point that you are making about the evolution of the two kinds of machine, but I do think that there is a basic difference here.

The comment on Aristotle was interesting. The point I was trying to make in the book is that I see a fundamental difference between Plato's teleology and Aristotle's teleology. I see Plato as using teleology to get to a God. That's what he does in the *Phaedo*, and according to Xenophon, that is the position he got from Socrates. Aristotle believes in this rather peculiar God who is like some of the girlfriends I've had who are totally indifferent to me, but just contemplating their own perfections. However, it does seem to me that Aristotle's teleology is one that is part of biology. As Aristotle was a working biologist, I take it in *The Parts of Animals* he was seeing what kind of cash value he can get out of it as a scientist. This is opposed to Plato in the *Phaedo*, who is making Socrates feel better because he is about to take the hemlock. As I say, I see a big difference there, and this is the thing we have been wrestling with through the generations.

I'm glad you raised the origin of life because that is one of the areas that I was too cowardly to deal with, and did not have enough space. You are right to say that anyone dealing with teleology ought to look at the origin of life issue. Paul Davis has explicitly said the origin of life requires some kinds of laws that we don't have. So it is a toss up, whether to go the naturalistic route like Stuart Kaufmann and think we can get the design naturally but not through natural selection or to go another route and say we need the design and the only way we can get it is from God. The origin of life issue has not been solved. It seems silly to say this, but we're only 50 years on from the discovery of the DNA molecule. People are working on the DNA molecule, but they haven't been working on the origin of life problem in modern molecular biology for more than 20 years. It does seem to me that people are making some significant progress on it, and they recognize the RNA molecule. RNA can use itself to reproduce in a way that DNA and polypeptides can't. Whilst it's not solved yet, and I accept that, it seems to me too early for us philosophers and theologians to say that it is insoluble. Plantinga said that quite explicitly, and so argued that we must invoke the great molecular biologist in the sky to solve this. I am always dubious about those philosophers and theologians who say the origin of life problem is insoluble. I am also dubious about the converse argument—a modern physics argument that says the big bang confirms the cosmological argument. It's the mitrochondrial Eve fallacy. We all have a common ancestor in Africa, 140,000 years ago, and a number of Christians said, "There we go, we have proof of the Garden of Eden." The trouble is, next year someone says the mitochondria don't do this and you're left with molecules all over your face. My temperament is to be wary of any proof from modern science or from modern non-science. Without wanting to weasel out of it, it is still way too early to say the origin of life is an insoluble problem and that, therefore, we must look for philosophical or religious or other answers. There is a really good textbook on evolutionary analysis by Freeman and Heron, now in the third edition. If you read their book, you wouldn't believe how quickly they have had to rewrite the

chapter on the origin of life each time, because the stuff is moving so quickly. Darwin's finches stay right the way through, but the origin of life stuff is moving so quickly that no-one can draw philosophical conclusions.

What about abductive reasoning? If you choose the best of lousy arguments, it's still a lousy argument. The counter-quote I like is by Sherlock Holmes: You know my methods, my dear Watson, and when you have eliminated the impossible, the highly improbable must be the only one that is true. I don't think abductive arguments prove anything. What abductive arguments try to do is to say if you eliminate all of these sorts of things—you have to look for explanations—let's look for the one which does seem to be the best, that does seem to do the best job. The whole point of the design argument is that it is a good argument. I do see design. The question is whether or not we have a better one.

One final thing: the multiple universes hypothesis is one where the science is moving so quickly, I wouldn't stake my position one way or the other on this. I'm worried just a little bit about the premises. The argument seems to be that "if the laws of nature weren't exactly as they are, then things would be another way." But this strikes me as like calculating the length of a piece of string by choosing a number, doubling it, and concluding that the length is half of that. I wish I knew what the strength of this sort of arguments is. It is a very plausible premise—if gravity wasn't as it is at the moment, then everything would come crashing down. But I am not sure what follows. I wish I could feel more confidence in that kind of argument. I worry about that, but let me just simply say thank you to all of you.

Notes on Contributors

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Ronnie Hawkins has a degree in medicine (M.D.) as well as a doctorate in philosophy (Ph.D.) from the University of Florida in Gainesville, and completed a residency in anatomic pathology at Yale. Some of the courses she teaches include Environmental Ethics, Ethics and Biological Science, Philosophy of Science, Existentialism, Philosophy, Religion, and the Environment, and Ethics in Science and Technology. Dr. Hawkins is interested in bringing an understanding of humans scientifically, as biological beings, in evolutionary and ecological context, together with the view that considers humans philosophically but that has often failed to make contact with the physical and biological dimensions of reality. She believes that as a species, we face a number of difficult challenges in the years ahead that necessitate our attaining a broader and more realistic understanding of ourselves in order to survive beyond the twenty-first century.

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Dave Monroe graduated in December from the University of West Florida. Upon graduating, he returned to his home state of Michigan. Dave volunteered as an assistant for the philosophy department at Lansing Community College and worked as a consultant in an area restaurant. At present, he is enrolled as a graduate student in philosophy at Western Michigan University.

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